34
UGUST 1988

SOVIET WEEKLY
WORLD AFFAIRS

NEW TIMES

Chile: a sect of butchers

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Kim IL Sung interviewed

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NEW TIMES

o. 34, August 1988

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POGORZHELSKY,
PUMPYANSKY,
SHEVCHENKO,
STARSHINOV

signer I. Shein

tor of English edition:
Smirnov

The first phase of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan has been completed. The Soviet servicemen have accomplished with credit their internationalist mission in that country. The long-awaited return to the homeland has been made possible by the Geneva accords. It would be wrong, however, to reduce the Geneva accords only to the evacuation of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, ignoring the commitments of other countries not to interfere in its domestic affairs.

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

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Vladimir Galin
BUSINESSMEN FROM ZATSEPA STREET

Front cover –
Nikolai Sivkov, a farmer from Archangel

Photo by Kiselev

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S. Tzrendorzh
Educationalist
Ulan Bator,
M.P.R.

■ In my view the principal result of the 19th All-Union Party Conference was that it drew up the position of the Soviet Communist Party's plitical programme with regard to perestroika. For four days the delegates to the conference heatedly, frankly and critically discussed their plans for the future in a completely democratic spirit. We have never before seen such pointed and open debates.

I can state with complete confidence that all of us – the people of the Soviet Union and your friends in socialist countries and elsewhere – were given an excellent lesson in glasnost.

Seliar Silva Rehermann,
Professor,
Havana, Cuba

■ I am a Uruguayan citizen now living in Cuba and working at Havana University. I should like to share some of my thoughts about the perestroika now under way in the U.S.S.R.

GLASNOST

OPINIONS

The first thing I should like to stress is that perestroika is the product of a socialism that has not been ossified, and is not bogged down by stereotypes. One could describe it as the application of Marxist-Leninist teachings to the present conditions of development in the Soviet Union.

But perestroika, its essence and application, are being seriously compromised by its so-called "champions." To begin with, on the pretext of backing the changes, they are preaching ideas that run counter to socialism and the philosophical and political tenets of Marxism-Leninism. They are exploiting the slogans, confining their championship of perestroika to the adoption of new simplified stereotypes, and seeking to represent themselves as defenders of the new policy by superficial criticism of the failings and miscalculations that are inevitable in the face of such a task. Instead of making at least a modest, but persistent and consistent effort, in such a hard and righteous struggle against, for instance, bureaucratism, they engage in empty talk about bureaucracy in general.

Can perestroika be helped on its way by a simple show of impatience at the slowness of the economic reforms without any concrete proposals of measures to promote its acceleration?

And another price perestroika has to pay is shedding light on the contradictory past. Its evaluation should be double checked, balanced and courageous.

I would say that the most important slogan today is "fewer words and more real action."

Ivan Kotlyar
Cand. Sc. (Phil.),
assistant Professor,
Department of Scientific Communism, Brest Pedagogical Institute,
U.S.S.R.

■ Recently a lot has been done to restore the historical truth and the good name of many political figures, scientists and men of culture who in the past were victims of undeserved accusations. One of them is Andrei Sakharov. He is now back in Moscow working at one of the Academy of Sciences' Institutes, contributing to newspapers and magazines.

And yet I would say that historical justice has not been done in full to Academician Sakharov. A lot of rubbish was written in the seventies and early eighties about him, his public activities, his wife, thereby creating in our minds a false picture of him. But to this day the authors of such articles have not admitted, putting it midly, the bias of their writings.

Many people today criticize the period of stagnation. But this criticism is all coming after the event, Sakharov, however, had the courage to come out openly at the beginning of the seventies against negative trends in government, which subsequently accumulated and led the country into difficulties. He at least tried to halt the country's slide into further deterioration, and that aroused the anger of those who were accustomed to rule without regard for the opinion of the people. Time has shown that had his advice been heeded the country would not have found itself in the dire straits it was in just before the April (1985) Plenum of the CC CPSU. I feel sure that he appealed to world public opinion during the years of stagnation because he was unable to speak out openly in his own country.

Alexander Bukhtiy
Kherson Region, U.S.S.R.

■ This year we celebrated the millennium of Christianity in Russia. It is undoubtedly a result of the changes taking place in our life. But were we always fair to the Church in the past? For 70 years we pretended that the Church did not exist at all, and tried to ignore it. In any case, neither writers nor artists took notice of it.

Nevertheless, during all these years the church has shared the joys and sorrows of the people and helped them in time of need, as it was, for instance, during the war against nazi Germany. I think that we are indebted to the Russian Orthodox Church and that the recognition of its services will not be confined to the celebration of its 1000th anniversary.

I hope that, in the future too, the Soviet believers will be full-fledged citizens of their country and will be able to take an active part in perestroika.

A MATTER AT ISSUE

Jaime Godoy
Sherbrooke,
Canada

■ I took great interest in Sergei Golyakov's article on China (No. 4/1988). It's very good that you write so much about the economic and social achievements of that country. Though perestroika is going full blast in the Soviet Union, you tell the readers unpardonably little about its progress. I wish you would carry more articles about the problems and successes of the Soviet people, and show that they, too, and not only the Chinese, can go shopping in large department stores. Here, in North America, very little information is available about the customs of Soviet people and their everyday life. After all, not all of them go in for ice hockey and ballet only.

Adriana Nikolič
Vienna, Austria

■ The question I'm interested in has lately come in for a great deal of attention in the Soviet press. Nor has the subject been bypassed by your magazine. I have in mind your reader's letter concerning the question of emigration from the Soviet Union and the view taken of those who in the seventies left your country not of their own free will, but were virtually expelled by the au-

orities. I think that if such eople want to come back, it n't exactly tactful to ask em a public repentance and explanation of the reasons r their emigration.

I feel very sorry for them, nce I know perfectly well w it feels to be away from me. I myself am a member the Austrian Communist rty. I live in Vienna and so e phenomenon of emigra- n unfolds under my very es. I am not an Austrian, but, grettably I cannot return to e country where I was born d the culture I belong to. obably that is another ason why I sympathize with ese people. And, of course, I not share the opinion ex- ssed by Nina Andreyeva in e paper Sovetskaya Rossiya t emigration is always a i with one's conscience. I sure that is far from being e case. When speaking of atriotism" and the "class ap- oach," one should obviously tinguish between the sons that led some Soviet citizens to go to other countries.

These reasons are far from simple or unequivocal. I think that each case should be considered with great care and not accuse all who left without exception. Incidentally, should one say that there are no longer any problems about leaving the U.S.S.R.? Emigration continues to this day, despite the public statements of those repatriated to the Soviet Union who by their own example show that life is far from sweet for former Soviet citizens in the West. I would like to learn as much as possible about the reasons for emigration so as to understand them myself and help others to do the same.

And I would also be glad if we Communists from other countries could say with a clear conscience that all nationalities in your country are equal not only under law, but in practice, and that it is not violation of this principle that prompts emigration. And that if a person does leave the U.S.S.R. it is not because he has been stripped of Soviet citizenship for political reasons, but because he really wants to be reunited with his relatives. I wish you success in your perestroika. Your success is the future of our common cause.

AN ARTIST'S COMMENT



wing by A. Chodorowski (Poland)

CARRYING ON THE DISCUSSION

Victor Potzukov
worker,
Novosibirsk Region

■ Tom Hopkins wrote that "Stalin did not destroy the foundations of socialism" (No. 29/1988). One can agree with that if socialism is viewed solely as state ownership of the means of production. In this he was more than successful and it reached the absurd situation where everything supposedly belonged to the people and no one was responsible for anything. Socialism is impossible without democracy, as is democracy without pluralism of opinion. Stalin, however, distorted and perverted democracy to such an extent that his version of socialism became hard to distinguish from his personal dictatorship.

The exposure of the mistakes and crimes committed in those years is not a sign of the weakness of socialism. On the contrary, it is a sign of its strength. It must ensure us against a repetition of our mistakes and stop leaders from turning into tin pot Napoleons. I agree that Tom Hopkins is not the only one to hold such views. Flowers are brought not only to the Mausoleum, but to Stalin's grave as well. But this only shows that people find it hard to part with their stereotypes, and their idols.

K. Albegov
Terek, U.S.S.R.

■ The formation of a debating society on peace and human rights (Hyde Park, socialist style, No. 27/1988) is in the spirit of the times. The idea has been prompted by the course of events. Nevertheless, it gives rise to doubt. First of all, for whom has the society been established? The impression is that only Muscovites will take part in it. But Moscow is only a particle of the Soviet Union. It would therefore be wrong for the society to assume the right to speak for all the people of the country.

Indeed, at the meetings of the society one can hear interesting suggestions and ideas capable of prompting major changes in public life. But words, no matter how wise, are only words, nothing more.

I think the society will become really valuable when it establishes a newspaper and begins publishing all the debates without exception, and without ommissions or distortions. Without a newspaper or bulletin, the work of the society will be merely self-deception.

If the society has its own newspaper, many people will be able to express their opinions on the pressing issues of the day. The truth will be crystallized when concerned opinions on these issues come from all corners of the country.

GLASNOST

PRIVATE OPINION

ANATOLY ADAMISHIN,
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.

I beg to disagree with New Times, which, incidentally, I hold in high esteem as it has recently improved considerably. An article in issue No. 33 claims that the Geneva meeting on an Angolan-Namibian settlement brought no practical results. That is not so. The U.S.–mediated talks between Angola, Cuba and South Africa made good progress. A principled agreement was reached on an important issue – to begin implementing Security Council Resolution 435 on Namibian independence on November 1. As a result of the Geneva round of talks, the evacuation of South African troops from Angola has been started and other measures for military disengagement in the south of the country have been taken.

True, a number of complex issues remain. It can't be said for certain that Pretoria will be prepared to make compromises in the future and will not reverse its policy, as has happened in the past. Incidentally, it would not be easy to do so in present circumstances. On the whole, I would say that the chances are fifty-fifty.

The Soviet Union is not a direct participant in the talks, but is playing a very active role in the settlement of this regional conflict, too. We are constantly in touch with our Cuban and Angolan friends, and are regularly exchange views with the Americans. An unofficial representatives of the Soviet Union has been present, and not merely as a detached observer, at all rounds of the talks. It is also hard to overestimate such factors as the general thaw in the international climate under the influence of the changes in Soviet foreign policy, greater interaction between the Soviet Union and the United States in regional affairs, and the chain reaction of the Afghan settlement.

ALBERTAS LAURINCIUKAS
writer, deputy to the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet

Visits by party and government leaders to different regions of the country have now become routine. Nevertheless, a recent meeting with Alexander Yakovlev, a Political Bureau member and Central Committee secretary, was an event for the citizens of our republic. He came to Lithuania shortly after the 19th Party Conference, whose decisions are firmly backed by Lithuanians in both words and deeds. Perestroika does not mean a facelifting operation on socialism, but a revolutionary solution to pressing problems and the intention to tackle issues whose urgency we have yet to appreciate fully.

In the conditions of glasnost and democracy, people in Lithuania and other republics have begun to discuss publicly the fundamental problems of mankind's survival and decent living conditions for every individual.

The Lithuanians are also concerned about problems sometimes described as "local," though the word is not entirely accurate. It is their desire that the Mazeikiai oil refinery, the N. Akmene cement plant, and other large industrial enterprises should present no danger to the environment, to keep our rivers and the Courland Spit clean. We want to know the whole truth about periods in our history that were relegated to oblivion in Stalin's time. We are concerned about problems relating to our culture and language.

The frank and businesslike discussion of vital problems impels us to implement perestroika more boldly and persistently and bring about a situation where fine words are backed up by practical work.

MUFTI TALGAT TADJUDDIN,
Chairman of Muslim Board of European part of the U.S.S.R. and Siberia

It is with deep sorrow that for more than seven years I have watched the fratricidal war between two Muslim countries – Iran and Iraq. This international conflict has sharply aggravated the explosive situation in the Middle East and claimed the lives of millions of innocent people.

The opposing sides have flouted the sacred principles of the Islamic teaching on peace and friendship. They have unleashed a bloody war undermining regional security and the unity of the Muslim world. They seem to have forgotten the words of the Prophet, who said that Muslims are a single body and that it is a great sin to shed the blood of other Muslims. The Prophet warned that Muslims who draw their swords against each other face damnation. He meant both the dead and those who killed them.

We Soviet Muslims have unanimously backed the government's proposals for a peaceful settlement of the conflict and repeatedly called on other believers to put an end to the fratricidal war as offensive to Allah. In this connection I sincerely welcome the end to the bloodshed, and the initial steps towards peace taken by the two countries in line with the appropriate U.N. resolution. I also urge our brothers to restore good-neighbourly reciprocal relations. I call on the peoples of Iran and Iraq to join the struggle for lasting peace in the world.

Goodbye, Kabul

From our special correspondent
Leonid Abramov

The effort towards a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan began in Geneva on April 14. Our country is one of the guarantors of the Geneva accords. The Soviet Union is steadily abiding by its commitments. Now it's time to review the progress of the implementation of the Geneva accords so far.

It was for this purpose that a strong party of newsmen "landed" in Kabul.

Yearning for national reconciliation

"It is a great honour for us to play host to such a representative group of journalists from many countries. We are prepared to offer you any information, but please tell the world public the truth about the situation in Afghanistan," Prime Minister Mohammad Hassan Sharq told a press conference.

In his address and his apt answers to questions, Mohammad Hassan Sharq gave newsmen an idea of how complex the situation in the country is. The national reconciliation policy is not propaganda slogan for the Afghan government. It is a vital necessity.

National reconciliation is steadily becoming a reality. The first session of the National Council, which discussed the composition of the new government, received a vote of confidence.

"Even my closest friends didn't believe it would ever happen," the Prime Minister confessed. "They predicted 30 per cent of the vote, at best. As it happened, the government won a landslide victory."

Mohammad Hassan Sharq does not belong to any party. Until now he has come up against no insoluble problems in his dealings with the members of his cabinet. He hopes they'll continue to trust him. The main thing now, he says, is to make an all-out effort towards national reconciliation. What matters is not membership of any one party, but one's usefulness to the national cause.

The journalists were then given a chance to meet with MPs and provincial governors, with refugees back from Pakistan and Iran, and the former commanders of armed opposition units.

The meetings furnished a wealth of evidence of the government's sincere commitment to national reconciliation, and its desire to make every effort to fulfil the terms of the Geneva Accords.

At the press conference many examples were given of Pakistan's opposition to the national reconciliation process. Islamabad's provocative actions pour oil on the flames of the fratricidal war.

People of various political views and convictions shared with me their concern, even indignation, at the senselessness of the armed opposition's "intractability."

Abound proof was furnished that resistance to the policy of national reconciliation led to a chaos of bloodshed and destruction. Over the war years, the country had already sustained losses and destruction to the tune of 10 billion dollars, with 60 per cent of its present budget going into defence and security.

Balucha, a former mujahedeen commander, is of the opinion that armed anti-government groupings would be in no position to seize power in the provinces after the withdrawal of the limited contingent of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. All they can do is make treacherous attacks.

"After the Soviet troops had left my native village," Balucha said, "an armed unit of the opposition tried to attack us. The fight lasted five days and five nights, but we managed to defend ourselves on our own."

The withdrawal of the limited contingent of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in strict conformity with the Geneva accords was certainly at the focus of Soviet and foreign journalists' attention.

Everyone ordered back alive

I witnessed the first Soviet army unit departing from Kabul. Many townspeople had come to say goodbye to Soviet officers and men on their way home. Colonel Stepan Kitsak answered journalists' questions briefly and appositely: "This is a motorized infantry unit about 500 strong leaving Kabul under its own power, complete with all its weapons. The border is 550 km away, 48 hours drive."

"Do you anticipate attacks by opposition armed forces on the home-bound Soviet troops?" the colonel was asked.

"This is not to be ruled out, especially on certain sections of the road. We have sent out special covering forces. The high risk stretches are covered by Soviet and Afghan troops."

Orders were snapped out, engines revved up, and a brassband broke into a traditional Russian farewell march that every Russian knows. Its strains sounded somewhat incongruous here under the high dazzlingly blue Afghan sky.

Armoured personnel carriers with our boys on board rolled past. They accepted flowers and garlands from the Afghans who had come to see them off with re-

straint and dignity befitting soldiers. Suddenly a woman's high-pitched voice cried out: "Good luck, boys!" in Russian – a Radio Moscow correspondent could no longer control her emotions. She forgot all about her microphone, and her eyes brimmed with tears. The boys started; to each, the voice must have sounded like his mother's.

On the previous night, they had parted with their comrades-in-arms those who were staying behind to guarantee the security of the withdrawing troops.

The enormous international crowd of journalists visited the positions of a unit to be pulled out at the second stage of the withdrawal.

We were met by Major-General Lev Serebrov, a spokesman of the Soviet military command in Afghanistan. On that day, the Soviet airborne unit opened practically all its "doors" to foreigners (journalists even!). The General invited the guests to "have a bite" which turned out to be a three-course meal of borshch, sausages, potatoes, vegetables and, of course, stewed fruit.

"Why has the Soviet Union decided to withdraw its troops?" a journalist asked the general.

"We think we have fulfilled our internationalist duty and must now go. We have passed our experience on to the Afghans and taught them a lot. May they now defend their country themselves," General Serebrov said.

Going in a worthy manner

Sergei Ososov and his mates are still in Afghanistan. Some will come home earlier, others later, but the deadline is February 15. They are certain to return alive and intact. This is what their comrades-in-arms, already on their way home, wished them.

It was a quiet Sunday, without a single missile falling on Kabul. As usual, there were sports contests between Soviet and Afghan soldiers. Our paratroopers demonstrated unarmed combat techniques specially for the guests.

Journalists from various countries spent nearly an hour in the unit's recreation room with Captain Sergei Ososov and his men, showering them with questions. It was a long, difficult and frank talk. I cannot possibly reproduce all of it here, but some fragments of the conversation seem worth mentioning.

Corporal Vladimir Pinchuk of Simferopol was asked what Afghanistan meant to him.

"I seem to have grown up here, I feel older than my age, after all I've seen my mates die right before my eyes. My whole frame of mind has changed."

"Your unit may be the last to leave. How do you feel about that?"

"All my mates are to be relied on. I am confident of them, and they are confident of me. We shall go with dignity!"

"That's a good answer!" the American journalist commented.

A touchstone

"We met in Kabul three months ago after the Soviet troop pullout from Afghanistan had just started. Today I can tell you that in accordance with the Geneva accords, 50 per cent of our troops have been withdrawn from Afghanistan as of August 15," Lieutenant-General Boris Gromov, the commander-in-chief of the limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, told the Kabul press conference.

The U.N. observers confirmed the Soviet general's report. Captain Kauko Aaltomaa of Finland, and Captain Khemant Kunwar of Nepal, both chary of words and matter-of-fact, as U.N. observers should be, told me that the withdrawal of Soviet troops was proceeding strictly to schedule. Khemant Kunwar added that he appreciated the privilege of being a U.N. observer in Afghanistan and thought that the United Nations had come to play a much more important role over the past few years in settling conflict situations in various parts of the world.

The meeting held on the occasion of a column of our troops departing from Shindand started a little later than scheduled, upon the arrival of a member of the military council from Tashkent. The sun was beating down mercilessly, but a group of journalists from various countries, who had already made each other's acquaintance, vigorously "questioned" representatives of the Soviet command, local Afghan leaders, and private soldiers. The brief meeting over, the column of Soviet troops set off towards the Soviet border. That column was to cross the border at Kushka, and the other near Termez. We journalists were taken to the border by armoured car, helicopter and transport plane so that we could witness the "homecoming." Frankly, we crossed the Soviet borders "illegally" on two occasions.

Finally, we were back in Kabul attending General Gromov's press conference. On August 15, when the results on the implementation of the Geneva package were summed up, President Najibullah of the Republic of Afghanistan met with journalists. He cited convincing examples of the Soviet and Afghan sides abiding by these provisions to the letter. Over three months, Soviet troops have left the provinces of Nangarhar, Kunar, Ghazni, Paktia, Badakhshan, Takhar, Kandahar, Hilmend, Farah, Loghar, Zabul and Kunduz.

While the Soviet Union and the Republic of Afghanistan are scrupulously fulfilling their Geneva commitments, Islamabad is encouraging interference in Afghanistan's affairs from its territory. The so-called "transitional Afghan government" has been formed in Peshawar with the Pakistani authorities' direct support. "The said actions by Pakistan," the Soviet government pointed out in its Statement of August 15, 1988, "are a gross violation of Article 2 of the Afghanistan-Pakistan agreement on the principles underlying their interrelations, specifically on non-interference and non-intervention."

As a result of Islamabad's provocative actions, the situation in the country remains extremely complex. Missile attacks on Kabul have intensified over the past few days. A large armed formation of the opposition seized the provincial centre of Kunduz, only to be knocked out of it by government troops shortly afterwards.

It was my own – and many others' – first time im Afghanistan, and surely ten days of the nine-year Afghan tragedy is too short a period in which to draw serious conclusions, but one thing is clear. As President of the Republic of Afghanistan, and PDPA General Secretary Najibullah pointed out, "Geneva marked not only the admission by all sides that it is impossible to solve the Afghan problem by force of arms; it was also an example of a sensible approach to settling this acute regional conflict on the basis of new political thinking." In our nuclear age, there is no alternative to such an approach.

And meanwhile, may the Soviet fighting men return home alive and unharmed.

EXCLUSIVE FOR NEW TIMES

Kim Il Sung:

Working together for the triumph of socialism

The General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and President of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is interviewed by the Editor-in-Chief of New Times

On September 9 North Korea celebrates the 40th anniversary of the proclamation of the Democratic People's Republic. What have the Korean people achieved in the past 40 years?

Our people will soon observe the 40th anniversary of the formation of their glorious republic. Forty years is a short period in the century-old history of our nation. But during these years, under the banners of the republic, the people have carried out the vast social and economic reforms their forefathers had been unable to bring about over centuries.

With the proclamation of the republic our people have become deserving masters of their sovereign independent state. Thanks to their patriotic selflessness and creative initiative in the building of a new society, the country has developed from being a backward colonial agrarian state into a socialist one with modern industry, advanced agriculture, and a flourishing national culture.

All the fetters of the old society have been abolished, and socialism has been established and is being consolidated daily. I would say this is the greatest achievement of our people's creative labour over the past 40 years.

The Korean people have been building a socialist economy in extremely difficult conditions. We inherited a distorted economy from the old society. Moreover, this economy was completely destroyed during the three-year war. In fact, after the war we had to begin economic construction from scratch. Moreover, U.S. imperialism and its henchmen continued their aggression and sabotage.

But our people firmly believed that, with power in their hands and correct party leadership, they would be able to achieve great things. In a heroic struggle they successfully restored the economy in three or four years, though our enemies claimed that even a hundred years would not be enough. In the next 14 years the people made a great leap forward by effectively carrying out the historic task of socialist industrialization of the country.

New branches of industry have been set up, the intrabranch structure has been improved and the modernization of plant effected in the course of implementing a number of long-term plans. A solid material and technical base has been created in agriculture thanks to irrigation and electrification and the large-scale use of machines and chemicals.

In the past our country did not manufacture even simple farm implements, and today it produces 10,000-ton presses, large oxygen installations, high-power hydraulic turbine generators, electric locomotives, large and special metal-cutting lathes, means of automation, electronic devices, and complete plant for modern factories.

In the space of five years we erected an eight-kilometre-long sea wall and built one of the world's largest sluices. The energetic construction of many major projects is simultaneously under way: large complexes for the production of chemicals and light metals, electric power stations, the Kwanbok residential district, and so on. All this would be impossible without a strong economic base.

We never sit back on our achievements. Our people are now successfully carrying out the third seven-year plan, a new long-term programme of socialist construction. Fulfilment of the third seven-year plan will considerably increase the country's economic power and raise living and cultural standards.

Morale as we carry out the third seven-year plan is very high. A 200-day work movement has been launched to mark the 40th anniversary of the republic, and a considerable rise in production and construction has been achieved in the

course of this drive. The people's tremendous revolutionary enthusiasm leads us to believe that the third seven-year plan will be successfully fulfilled.

The Soviet Union was the first country to recognize the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and establish diplomatic relations with it. The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, concluded more than 25 years ago is of special importance in our relations. Recently, the content of Soviet-Korean friendship has been considerably enhanced. What are the possibilities for expanding our economic, scientific and technical cooperation and developing production cooperation and joint economic activity?

The relations of friendship and cooperation between the Korean and Soviet peoples have been growing in our long joint struggle against imperialism to bring about the triumph of socialilsm and communism. The Soviet Union helped Koreans in their struggle to liberate their homeland, with its sons shedding their blood for this cause, and gave them considerable assistance in building the new society.

The long-standing Korean-Soviet friendship, based on the principles of proletarian internationalism, is underwritten by the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. It is expanding in every field in line with the agreements reached at a high-level meeting in Moscow in 1986. It should be noted in particular that economic and technical cooperation and exchanges between our countries have been developing recently on a wide scale, at a new and higher level. This is contributing to the successful building of socialism in both countries and the consolidation of Korean-Soviet friendship.

I think our two countries have considerable opportunities for the further expansion of economic, scientific and technical cooperation, coproduction and joint economic activity.

As friendly socialist nations, the D.P.R.K. and the Soviet Union have a common interest in promoting mutual cooperation and exchanges, and possess a vast economic and technical potential for reciprocal exchanges, cooperation, coproduction and joint economic activity. Our countries are neighbours divided by a river, and therefore have geographically favourable conditions for economic and technological exchanges and cooperation.

The D.P.R.K. and the Soviet Union are now elaborating a programme for economic, scientific and technical cooperation till the year 2000 and are taking measures to expand cooperation and exchanges, coproduction and joint economic activity in the power, metallurgical, machine-building, timber, light and electronic industries, as well as in agriculture, and various fields of modern science and technology. Considerable possibilities also exist for expanding economic cooperation in different forms, including joint economic activity, between our country and the Far Eastern region of the Soviet Union.

If the governments and peoples of our two countries use the opportunities properly and make combined efforts, their economic and technical exchanges and cooperation will steadily increase.

Our readers know about Pyongyang's initiatives towards a relaxation of tension in the Korean peninsula. Together with our Korean friends, we believe that putting an end to military and political confrontation is the main task in the peninsula, and vigorously support the idea of turning it into a peaceful nuclear-free zone, as well as efforts to establish a constructive North-South dialogue with the aim of unifying Korea on a peaceful and democratic basis without outside interference. The Soviet Union has advanced the idea of a comprehensive approach to Asian security by the efforts of all countries concerned. As a large Asian and Pacific power, the Soviet Union seeks to give every possible encouragement to the peacemaking process in that vast and populous region. What are the prospects for expanding cooperation between our parties and countries in this direction?

The situation in the Asian-Pacific region remains tense because of the aggressive and instigating moves of U.S. imperialism. Declaring that the 21st century will be a "Pacific age," the United States is trying hard to acquire dominance in the region with its vast economic potential. In particular, it is seeking to implement its aggressive strategy by turning South Korea -- an important military-strategic area -- into a U.S. base. It maintains tens of thousands of troops in South Korea and has placed upwards of 1,000 nuclear weapon units of various types there.

But that does not satisfy the United States. In the recent time the supply of the means of delivery of nuclear warheads to South Korea has not abated, large depots for nuclear weapons have been built there; it has injected new life into Seoul's military pact with Japan, and frequently holds nuclear war games in South Korea and its waters. In connection with the 24th Olympics, the U.S. imperialists are being increasingly provocative, thus aggravating the situation on the Korean peninsula. It is small wonder that people in many countries are watching the tense situation there with profound anxiety.

The maintenance of peace on the peninsula and the peaceful reunification of Korea is an urgent demand of our nation and, simultaneously, a pressing issue in ensuring peace in the Asian-Pacific region and the world.

Motivated by a noble sense of responsibility for peace in the Asian-Pacific region and the world, the party and government of the republic are doing everything in their power to ease tension in the peninsula and bring about the peaceful reunification of Korea through dialogue and negotiation.

We have advanced a number of proposals, including one to declare the Korean peninsula a peaceful, nuclear-free zone, end large-scale military exercises,

and gradually reduce the armed forces. This year, with the aim of solving the urgent issues of détente in the peninsula, we have put forward the idea of holding a North-South conference, to be attended by representatives of political parties, public organizations and various strata of the population south and north, including their leaders. We have also proposed holding bilateral and multilateral contacts and talks between representatives of all political parties, groups and various strata of the population south and north prior to this joint conference.

The Soviet Union is giving vigorous backing to the efforts of the Korean people to bring about détente in the peninsula and the peaceful reunification of the country. Our people draw great inspiration and strength from this support.

The Soviet Union has put forward the idea of a comprehensive approach to ensuring Asian security through the combined efforts of all interested countries, and is doing everything in its power to make this a reality. We give unqualified support to the proposals advanced by Mikhail Gorbachev in Vladivostok. He called for security in the Asian-Pacific region and the creation of a zone of peace and cooperation free of nuclear weapons and the threat of war in the area.

As both are situated in the Asian-Pacific region, it is in the mutual interest of the D.P.R.K. and the U.S.S.R. to maintain peace in the region. The peoples of our two countries have a long record of joint struggle against imperialist aggression in defence of peace.

In keeping with the common desire of our peoples, the Workers' Party of Korea and the D.P.R.K. government will continue to cooperate with the CPSU and the Soviet government to achieve a lasting peace in the Asian-Pacific region. If, acting in close unity, the parties, governments and peoples of our two countries step up their joint efforts to foil the aggressive and provocative schemes of imperialism in the Asian-Pacific region, the cause of regional and world peace will be considerably enhanced.

What do you expect of the progress at the Soviet-U.S. high-level talks?

The Soviet-U.S. high-level talks – of which several rounds have already been held – had pressing international problems on their agenda, including the reduction of nuclear armaments and the settlement of regional conflicts, and a certain amount of progress has been achieved in resolving a number of these problems. Both sides jointly stated at the talks that nuclear war is inadmissible, and concluded a treaty on the abolition of medium- and shorter-range missiles. I would describe this as an appreciable success consonant with the desire of all nations to avert nuclear war and preserve peace.

The Soviet-U.S. high-level talks have clearly de monstrated which power is making earnest efforts to preserve peace and which is acting against the cause of world peace.

The Soviet-U.S. summit meetings have been held and some progress on the issue of nuclear arms reduction has been achieved thanks to the earnest and painstaking efforts of the Soviet Union, which is doing its best to reduce world tensions and maintain universal peace.

At the recent Soviet-U.S. summit in Moscow the Soviet Union has advanced a proposal to halve strategic offensive weapons along with other proposals for arms reduction, and it tried hard to get these proposals accepted. At the same meeting the Soviet Union also energetically backed the proposals of the Workers' Party of Korea and the D.P.R.K. government for a peaceful solution of the Korean problem and pressed the United States to evacuate its aggressive nuclear-armed troops from South Korea.

We greatly appreciate the Soviet Union's principled stand and its efforts for peace at the summit talks with the United States.

The Soviet-U.S. high-level talks have shown that Washington has not given up its position of strength. At the summit talks in Moscow the United States continued to insist on its aggressive "star wars" programme and stood firm against a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem. This indicates that the U.S. imperialists are paying lip service to peace and in fact have no intention of bringing about nuclear disarmament or settling regional problems.

If the United States sincerely intends to reduce its nuclear armaments and settle regional problems, it should pull its nuclear-armed troops out of South Korea immediately. The United States has no grounds whatever for keeping its aggressive troops and nuclear weapons in South Korea. Since we do not possess nuclear weapons, there is no need for the United States to keep a large quantity of nuclear weapons in South Korea; and if the nuclear weapons stationed there are targeted on other socialist countries, there is no reason why they should remain in South Korea at a time when the Soviet-U.S. INF treaty has already come into force.

Though the United States still insists that the withdrawal of foreign troops is an important condition for the settlement of regional conflicts, it does not want to evacuate its aggressive troops from South Korea. Such a position is unwarranted, especially today when we are witnessing a tendency towards the evacuation of foreign troops from different parts of the world.

In our opinion, further progress at the Soviet-U.S. high-level talks depends wholly on Washington's approach to them. We hope that these talks, meeting the imperatives of the time and the hopes of peace-loving nations, will make a positive contribution to the prevention of nuclear war and the maintenance of world peace.

PYONGYANG, July 21, 1988

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Green light on the "green line"



What results can an intercommunal dialogue bring?

It happened in central Nicosia on the last Sunday of July. A 19-year-old Greek Cypriot was chatting with Turkish Cypriots on the "green line" dividing their homeland. The lads had a good few subjects to talk about: for a long time they had been defending the same sector of the line from each other.

It was not surprising therefore that an unarmed Greek, with the consent of his Turkish counterparts, approached closer to the line. Though they are prohibited from doing so by their officers, the "potential enemies" in the buffer zone often chat and treat each other to cigarettes, fruit and Coca-Cola.

But the sentries from the neighbouring post on the Turkish Cypriot side did not know the intentions of the 19-year-old Greek and fired on him. Another victim was added to the list of losses in the protracted regional conflict.

The forcibly divided country is full of paradoxes, the tragic coexisting with the absurd. The mayors of the Greek and Turkish parts of the capital have to negotiate a repair to its sewer network, and the negotiations are almost an act of diplomacy. A Cypriot living on the free territory of the republic has to go to Athens in order to put a call through to the occupied north. Many can see their native town or village only through binoculars or on television.

In these circumstances no one was surprised to learn that President Georgios Vasiliou, who speaks on behalf of the Greek Cypriots, and Rauf Denktas, leader of the Turkish community, had chosen Geneva as the venue for their first meeting, though their residences are only several hundred metres apart. The "green line" exists not only on maps but also in the hearts of the people, who do not trust each other.

Georgios Vasiliou

Georgios Vasiliou was born in 1931; received a secondary education in Cyprus and higher economic education in Budapest and London, where he was awarded a Ph.D.

In 1962 he returned to Cyprus, where he founded the Middle East Marketing Research Bureau. In 1984 he opened a school of managers and computer operators. Vasiliou is on the boards of many economic and financial organizations and has written a number of books on marketing. He is an honorary lecturer at the Cranfield Institute of Technology in Great Britain.

In the presidential election last February he ran as an independent candidate. His programme of economic and social reforms and his approach to settling the Cyprus issue had been backed by progressive democratic circles. He is married and has three children.

A view from Moscow

Nikolai Afanasievsky. Head of the First European Department, U.S.S.R. Foreign Ministry

The situation in Cyprus has remained complex for many years. Though there is no such open and bitter confrontation between the two communities as, say, in the Middle East, shots are nevertheless occasionally fired on the "green line" that divides the island. The sporadic aggravation of tension throws into a fever not only the island, but also the surrounding area, and other countries involved in the Cyprus problem. The failure to reach a settlement is causing friction between Greece and Turkey, countries that are friendly and geographically close to us.

It should not be forgotten that Cyprus is practically the only unresolved political and territorial problem in the all-European process. It may be recalled that Cyprus, as well as the Soviet Union, took part in the Helsinki conference. I could also mention here the responsibility of the Soviet Union as a major world power and permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, which, incidentally, has been tackling the Cyprus problem for several years.

The general approach of our policy to regional conflicts has found reflection, in particular, in the joint Soviet-American statement adopted at the Washington summit on December 10, 1987. It pointed to the need to help the sides involved in regional conflicts to find peaceful solutions leading to their independence, freedom and security. No selfish intentions lie behind such an approach. As for Soviet interests in the region, they can be achieved only within the framework of a mutually acceptable settlement.

The Cyprus problem has two –

U.S. transport plane at the British military base in Akrotiri. Doesn't this explain the West's reluctance to discuss initiatives for the demilitarization of Cyprus?

For Vasiliou it will be the first experience of the kind. Denktas has put his signature to several agreements between the communities, but none of them has been implemented. What proposals from the novice politicians could be acceptable to the veteran? Is there a chance that this time the dialogue will not be stalled?

Denktas has already accepted one proposal of Vasiliou's – to meet without preliminary conditions or an agenda. Nor does he object in principle to a federal system, backed by the President, though in the past he favoured the idea of a confederation. As for the principal issue – the withdrawal of Turkish troops and settlers – there are almost no points of contact between them. Denktas's tenacity can be explained by the tough line pursued by Ankara, the main source of power of the Tukish Cypriot leader.

Why did Denktas agree to meet with Vasiliou? After all, the question of occupation troops and settlers will be raised in any case. First, a refusal by Denktas to meet with the President would look like a challenge to the United Nations and an open policy of division, whereas the Turkish Cypriot leaders do not want to be seen as separatists. Secondly, they regard Vasiliou not only as a more flexible but also as a more respectable partner than his predecessor.

Indeed, Vasiliou still enjoys the support of the left-wing coalition that brought him to power, and has secured the loyalty of the influential centre-right Democratic Rally. All the political forces of the Greek community are represented in the re-emergent National Council – an interaction inconceivable under the former president. Turkish Cypriots are also taking into account Georgios Vasilious's prestige as a financial expert in U.S., West European and Middle East business circles.

Nevertheless, fewer changes have so far occurred in Cyprus than in the outside world. The Soviet-American break-

ternal and international – aspects, and they are to my mind, interconnected. Only the Cypriots can work out viable solutions on problems regarding the state system and the relationship between the two communities. The main thing is not to allow external forces to exert direct or indirect pressure on them.

The forthcoming meeting between the two Cypriot leaders is undoubtedly a positive event. I regard this step as a manifestation of responsibility and political wisdom. It is to be hoped that the meeting will be the starting point for resuming the much needed intercommunal dialogue.

Of great importance in the settlement process are the efforts of the U.N. Secretary-General, and the continuation of his good offices in line with the Security Council mandate.

The Soviet Union has repatedly declared its readiness to help find solutions concerning the international aspect of the problem, and especially to guarantee the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus and the prevention of foreign interference in its affairs. We think that a representative international conference on Cyprus within the framework of the U.N. could be an appropriate means of achieving such solutions.

Our ministry is constantly drafting proposals as to the contribution the Soviet Union could make to a Cyprus settlement. They were expressed, in particular, in the principles of Cyprus settlement and ways of achieving it, made public on January 21, 1986. The document invites other countries to make collective efforts in the search for the most effective ways of bringing about a comprehensive and just solution of the Cyprus problem.

This work should result – and there is practically no difference of opinion here – in the guaranteed preservation of the Republic of Cyprus as an independent, sovereign and territorially integral state pursuing a policy of non-alignment in line with the choice of its people.

Rauf Denktas

Rauf Denktas was born in 1924, received his secondary education in Cyprus, studied law in London in 1944-47.

In the 1950s Rauf Denktas entered politics and became president of the Federation of Turkish Cypriot Associations. In 1958 he took part in the discussion of the Cyprus problem in the U.N. In 1960 he was elected President of the Turkish Communal Chamber. In 1964-68, except for a short interval, he lived in Turkey. In 1973 he was elected Vice-President of Cyprus. After the landing of Turkish troops in 1974 and the division of the island he became head of the Turkish Cypriot administration. In November 1983 Denktas was proclaimed President of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus," which was recognized only by Turkey. He is married and has four children.

Three views from Cyprus

Major General Günter Greindl (Austria), Commander of the U.N. Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus

The main task of U.N. troops in Cyprus is to prevent clashes between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and provice normal conditions for the life of both communities. No cease-fire accord has been signed since the events of 1974. The conflicting parties have made only unilateral statements. This is having an adverse effect on the fulfilment of the U.N. force's mission on the island.

In the last few years we have succeeded in reaching mutual understanding between the sides on cease-fire terms on different sectors of the "green line. " But a number of sectors still remain hot spots. We are particularly worried about those sectors where there is direct contact between the sides. The buffer zone between them, especially in Nicosia, is only 20 metres wide. In the absence of an agreement this is a very dangerous proximity.

At the same time the recent incidents have had an isolated character. This is indicative of the relative stability achieved thanks to the presence of U.N. troops. Our task is not only to separate the opposing sides but also to provide conditions for rapprochement between them. Our contingent has a special service to promote intercommunal ties, in the sphere of power and water supply in particular.

Mustafa Akinci, General Chairman of the Communal Liberation Party

There is no question of the dialolgue which begins on August 24 failing. The main task is to prevent a deadlock at the intercommunal talks scheduled to open in Nicosia next month and to bring about a just, lasting and balanced federative solution. Only the will of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots can ensure a durable settlement of the Cyprus problem. A meeting between the leaders alone is not enough. The parliaments, political parties, trade unions, cultural and art societies and the press of the two communities should take part in this process. The representatives of both sides should be able to meet and make a positive contribution to a settlement.

Michael E. Sherifis, Ambassador of the Republic of Cyprus to the Soviet Union

As you know, the basic objective of my government, of President Georgios Vasiliou himself, and – I believe – of all my compatriots is to see Cyprus peaceful, united and free from foreign troops and settlers. We wholeheartedly hope that the negotiations, which start on August 24, will pave the way for such a solution, which will also safeguard the fundamental human rights of all Cypriots. Today in Cyprus we mark the "day of remembrance" for my home city of Famagusta, which was occupied by the Turkish armed forces exactly 14 years ago. The whole population of the city was forced to flee on that day. Like all my fellow citizens, I have been unable to visit, let alone return to my home ever since. Famagusta is a ghost city today, although the return of its inhabitants was agreed to be a matter of priority in the high-level agreement of 1979. Also, U.N. Security Council resolution of 1984 specifically called for their return to the city, which should be placed under U.N. administration. But we are again optimistic that we shall be able to return to our homes. The negotiations starting in a few days will lead, we hope, to the realization of this dream.

through in the field of disarmament and détente has transformed the international climate. The initial steps towards settling the Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq, southern African and Southeast Asian conflicts have been welcomed by politicians in the Eastern Mediterranean as a happy precedent.

The first result is Greek-Turkish rapprochement. This certainly favours a settlement in Cyprus, as previous differences between the "mother countries" turned out to be a national catastrophe for the Cypriots. For Tukish Premier Turgut Ozal, good-neighbourly relations with Greece are an earnest of future success in his efforts to join the European Community. The recent promise of Andreas Papandreou not to oppose the admission of Ankara is only an incentive. Everything depends on how long Greek-Turkish rapprochement lasts. It may not continue at all if Ankara does not end the occupation and colonization ofNorthern Cyprus. Incidentally, the other members of the European Community are not enthusiastic about the Turkish presence on the island.

To get the matter off the ground, an incentive should be given by the United States, the senior NATO partner. Georgios wanted to secure such an incentive during his visit to Washington early in August. He asked Reagan to persuade Ankara to leave Cyprus. But, speaking in principle for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of other countries, the U.S. President refused to take an active position. A global strategy is still more important for Washington than the fates of small nations. In the Eastern Mediterranean it is most of all concerned about shoring up NATO's southern flank, of which Turkey is the principal link.

Some believe that alarming symptoms have appeared in relations between Ankara and the United States. Contrary to last year's decision in Congress lifting the ban on the use of U.S. arms in Turkish-occupied zone, the Pentagon, shipping recently a new batch of weapons to Turkey, expressed the hope that they would not be used against Cyprus. Moreover, U.S. military aid has been reduced in the last few years and, going back on its own promises, Washington is not meeting Ankara halfway on the issue of the repayment of Turkey's military debts.

Ankara is alarmed by the prospect of Michael Dukakis winning the forthcoming presidential election. It believes that his Greek origin makes Dukakis especially vulnerable to anti-Turkish influences and that the United States could put an end to its "favourable neutrality." In that case Turkey and, following it, the Turkish Cypriot administration, would have to make concessions.

But that is in the realm of prediction. What can intercommunal talks achieve today? It is naive to expect a comprehensive settlement as too many external factors are involved in the conflict.

But this does not mean that an intercommunal dialogue is useless at the present stage. It gives both sides a chance to make a breach in the wall of alienation and resume political and, subsequently, other contacts.

V. Kulistikov and Y. Lebedev (Moscow)
Mikhail Mashkov (Nicosia)
Photo by AP–TASS and Valentin Mastyukov

QUOTATIONS

enan Evren,
resident of the Republic Turkey

"Turkey is a faithful ember of the NATO al- nce, but it has not re- ived an adequate amount military assistance. Tur- y annually needs a sum 1 billion dollars in order modernize its forces. is is something that all TO commanders have id for a long time, but we ve never been able to ob- n it. We are disappointed the reductions in Ameri- n assistance to Turkey. e proposals of the ad- nistration are always re- ed by the Congress.

"We should also bear other points in mind. e is that Turkey main- ns the second largest y in Europe after the ted States. The second hat one–third of the line t would have to be de- ded against a Warsaw ct invasion would be de- ded by Turkish sol- ers...

"We are not concerned all by this prospect (that chael Dukakis might be- me the next U.S. presi- nt – Ed.) Although the esident may be of Greek gin, he would be a U.S. izen and he would repre- nt American interests."

ang Zhipin,
irector, the Soviet and ast European Studies stitute at the Shanghai ction of the Chinese cademy of Social Sci- ces .

The reform in our untry has already been der way for ten years, d has achieved great re- its, but there are still a nsiderable number of dif- ulties and obstacles. I lieve that the greatest ob-

"Now I see what its top-secret propellant is!"
Drawing by Vsevolod Arsenyev

stacle is the Stalinist theoretical model, and the greatest difficulty the fact that it is no easy matter to break with this theoretical model.

After Lenin, the greatest and most enduring Russian influence on China was Stalin. ...Stalin's theoretical activity extended to philosophy, economics, politics, history, law, literature and art, and linguistics. Many of his theories are now seen to be incorrect and erroneous. For example, he called determinism "fatalism," absolutized the Soviet experience of building socialism, oversimplified the theory of the state and the party and opened the way to arbitrariness in legislation... If we consider the field of economics, then the Stalinist theory of socialism and the transition to communism, industrialization and accumulation, the collectivization of agriculture, socialist ownership, the planned economy, the commodity economy, and the law of value under socialism, the functions of the economy in a country governed by the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the universal crisis of capitalism are all full of the metaphysical errors of one–sidedness and absolutization... and could even have developed into ideological fetters that would prop up the old system and hinder the development of the new."

Akira Sono,
Prominent Japanese political figure, former Japanese ambassador to the F.R.G.

"It would be naive to imagine that if bullets are flying between states, then there is war, while if their leaders are shaking hands there is peace. The leaders of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. reached agreement on 'the inadmissibility of nuclear war' because they now appreciate the reality of the situation now, when the 'means of warfare' themselves have changed. War as such between states is no longer waged. But it is waged by confusing public opinion, and the political and economic destabilization of other countries. Life in the world today has been complicated by the development of the information network. By manipulating the mass media of another country, appealing to its public by radio, it is possible to form the public opinion and even the policy of the government of another power. Given this phenomenon, discrepancies in economic and technical potential can lead to changes in the balance of the armed forces.

"Thus, concentrating attention of the 'means of warfare,' it is possible to assess the international situation. Proceeding from this point of view, in the whole postwar period, I have never been afraid that that nuclear war could break out, and by the same token I have never experienced any euphoria as to the outcome of summit conferences, never flattered myself with the idea that the results would embody the hopes for peace."

Yosef Ben–Aharon
Director General of the Office of Israeli Prime Minister

The danger is there all the time. There are people in the U.S. administration who are constantly signalling to the PLO that if it shifts its positions, it will be recognized by the United States.

But at the same time, on global issues, we're very close. We vote with the United States at the United Nations more than any other country in the world because we see eye to eye on many international issues.

A dangerous delusion

Sergei Golyakov



On August 20 the cease-fire agreement between Iran and Iraq comes into effect, and representatives from both countries will enter into direct negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations. Perez de Cuellar, the U.N. Secretary-General, says he expects no serious problems to arise in discussing such questions as troop withdrawal to behind internationally recognized borders and exchanges of POWs, which are the next items of his plan for the fulfilment of U.N. Security Council Resolution 598.

In the meantime, a group of military cease-fire observers is being formed at the U.N. headquarters. It will include unarmed representatives from about 25 countries. Major General Slavko Jovic of Yugoslavia has been appointed to head the mission.

And so the flames of the longest and bloodiest conflict on our planet over the past few decades are going out in the Persian Gulf. How has it become possible to extinguish this conflagration, which seemed to have got completely out of control? I agree with those who give the credit for the settlement of the conflict to the U.N. and its Secretary-General, and regard it as an outcome of the overall improvement of the international climate and of Soviet-American relations.

"It is now clear," Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the F.R.G.'s Foreign Minister, told a Deutschlandfunk radio station reporter, "that East–West cooperation in the Security Council in adopting Resolution 598 of July 20, 1987, paved the way for the settlement and thus laid the ground for the U.N. Secretary-General's efforts." "The United Nations," the French newspaper L'Humanité stresses in this connection, "becomes all the more effective the more nations, big and small, demand that the world community pay heed to their opinion."

Certain changes in the belligerents' views have also contributed to the cease-fire, of course. Hashemi Rafsanjani, speaker of the Iranian parliament, was one of the first to realize that by insisting on continued hostilities his country risked finding itself in isolation. Having given up plans to overthrow the ruling regime in Baghdad, Iran is now announcing, through its representatives, that it neither wants to carry on the war with Iraq, nor seeks to capture the neighbouring country's territory by force of arms.

Is this an instance of new political thinking? Probably, although I'm rather inclined to think that a more likely explanation is the rivals' awakening to the senselessness of the armed conflict, the futility of their attempts to outfight each other on the battlefield. It is only to be regretted that this awakening has come too late, the conflict having already claimed more than a million lives and caused an estimated aggregate damage about 500 billion dollars. Nevertheless, the belligerents would hardly have come to terms but for such developments as the settlement in Afghanistan, the agreements on breaking the deadlock in the south of Africa, the overall easing of the explosive situation marked by the hostility, suspicion and mistrust that breed regional conflicts.

Sheer force is absolutely out

Settling such conflicts peacefully is an imperative of the times. This calls, more than anything else, for a highly responsible, careful, one can even say delicate, approach. Strong–arm methods, brigand raids and permanent threats of force won't do here at all.

This view is not shared by all, however. While welcoming an end to the Iran–Iraq bloodshed, Washington, for instance, voices the opinion that this good news only goes to bear out "the value of the power politics" the U.S. has pursued in the Persian Gulf.

This is an old and dangerous delusion! If it goes by this logic, the U.S. ought to list among its "peacemaking" actions the shooting down of the Iranian airliner with almost 300 passengers on board by an American missile over the Strait of Ormuz, the double-dealing arms sales "operation," furnishing the belligerents with the intelligence information obtained by means of the AWACS planes. It is clear to all that all these provocative actions only served to protract and aggravate the crisis in the region used by Washington as a pretext for the accelerated build-up of its military presence there. The United States' intention, officially announced in Washington the other day, to keep its forces in the Gulf after the termination of hostilities between Iran and Iraq is entirely unwarranted under the present circumstances.

Let me mention another aspect of the Iran–Iraq settlement. I mean the financing of the group of U.N. military observers who are to monitor the border between the two countries. Today the U.N. Secretary–General is short of the funds requisite for the purpose. Financial crisis has been coming to a head for years because the U.S. is more than 466 million dollars behind with its annual contributions.

At a recent press conference, Perez de Cuellar described as "very good" a journalist's question as to when the U.S. was going to pay its debt to the U.N. You are an American, aren't you? So, why don't you advise your government to back this peace–keeping effort all out? the Secretary–General said.

As we can see, there are many ways in which Washington can demonstrate its sincerity in wanting an early peace in the Gulf. For all the variety of the means available towards this end, one – sheer force – is absolutely out. An imperial foreign policy is hopelessly out of date.

Dollar-dominated currency system in an impasse

Professor Mikhail Burlakov,
D. Sc. (Econ.)

Instability, imbalance, volatility. Over the past twenty years these have been the three predominant characteristics of the international currency system, created in the early postwar years with a view to stabilizing the world economy.

The exchange rates of the capitalist currencies, the U.S. dollar in particular, have been fluctuating since the early seventies. This has continually altered price differentials in international trade and upset the balance of international payments. Currency instability exacerbates the long-term trade and payment imbalances between the West and the developing world. The rise in the lending and dollar exchange rates at the beginning of the eighties made the Third World's foreign debt an acute global problem. On the other hand, the debt crisis threatens the West's currency system with a chain reaction of bankruptcies. The feverish condition of the money market, beset with currency problems, could well spread to other areas of the capitalist economy.

The currency system created after the war as a provision against a relapse into the Great Depression, has become, in itself, a major "headache" for world capitalism. Having lost its advantages, the international currency system in its present form can now no longer guarantee financial, trade and economic stability.

So what were the advantages of the currency system established at Bretton Woods 44 years ago? And why has it lost them?

Achilles' heel

The chief advantage of the currency system created in 1944 was that it stabilized national currency exchange rates based on the fixed gold parity of the U.S. dollar. The unwavering official gold price – 34 dollars per troy ounce (31.1 grams) – which the member states of the International Monetary Fund went by in settling their accounts guaranteed the stability of all currencies' exchange rates. As such, the setting of a fixed gold currency standard was a step forward in the development of international account settling practice. It relieved settlements of the excessive rigidity of the gold exchange standard, a legacy of the 19th century. Moreover, the gold currency standard put an end to the financial chaos born of the world crisis and the protracted depression of the thirties. Similarly, at Bretton Woods a mechanism was created to level out discrepancies in settlements between IMF member states by granting them credits on easy terms in foreign currency from the Fund's capital.

The predictability of the postwar money market situation was also due to the fact that a currency's value against the gold standard came to be determined by its exchange rate in terms of the U.S. dollar – then the steadiest national currency unit, characterized as it was by reliable gold and commodity guarantees.

The U.S. had an indisputable lead in the postwar capitalist economy, and so the dollar assumed the role of the international currency reserve. The fact that the U.S. was the military–political leader of the West was also a substantial factor in asserting the dominance of the dollar. All this, plus the objective merits of the international account-settling mechanism created at Bretton Woods, enabled the IMF currency system to cater to international economic exchanges successfully till the end of the sixties.

The crisis of the dollar in the early seventies, which manifested itself in Washington's refusal to exchange dollars for gold in settling international accounts,

As the founding fathers of the IMF posed for this picture at Bretton Woods 44 years ago none of them had the slightest idea that some 20 years later the U.S. economic supremacy would be a thing of the past.

its two devaluations (in 1971 and 1973) and its subsequent floating led to radical changes in the balance of economic and financial forces between the three centres of capitalism – the U.S., Western Europe and Japan. These changes were recorded in the currency agreements signed by the IMF member states in Kingston, Jamaica, in 1976. The agreements deprived the Bretton Woods system of its principal asset – the stability of currency exchange; the Jamaica currency reform formalized the changeover from fixed to floating currency exchange rates.

At that time the reform was seen as an objective necessity. Floating exchange rates, Western economists claimed, made the currency system flexible and immediately responsive to changes in the money market and the correlation of economic forces. In fact, however, the Jamaica reforms marked the end of the Bretton Woods system, which collapsed and ceased to be an instrument of stable international currency exchange. Moreover, the system had had its Achilles' heel from the outset. The stability it was intended to guarantee depended on the erratic fortunes of the U.S. dollar. Nevertheless, this Achilles' heel was perpetuated by the Jamaica reform as the basis of the currency system. The dollar was allowed to keep its "currency throne," although it could no longer serve as a reliable currency exchange standard.

The U.S. share in capitalist industrial production dwindled from 50 per cent in 1956 to 34.5 per cent in 1985, while that of the EEC countries and Japan, taken together, increased from 32 to 53.1 per cent, respectively (EEC – 36.1; Japan – 17). The United States' share in the world export trade has fallen from 18 to 9 per cent, while the EEC and Japan now account for about half of it (40 % and 9 % respectively). Today the U.S. possesses a fifth of the West's gold reserve, as against half after World War II.

As its economic potential grew and it gained an ever firmer foothold on the world market, Western Europe became stronger financially. Japan also revolutionized its industrial structure and strengthened up its finances. By becoming the world's leading creditor in the mid–eighties, it strengthened the international position of the yen. The economic and foreign trade potential of some developing countries – the so–called "newly industrialized countries," in particular – increased. Whereas in 1973 the developing countries accounted for 6.4 per cent of the world's trade in manufactured goods, in the mid–eighties the figure grew to 12.5 per cent.

In the eighties, the crisis of the dollar was further aggravated by "Reaganomics" and the steady rise in military spending, which put an unprecedented strain on the U.S. finance and credit system. Record-breaking federal budget deficits were further complicated by enormous deficits in the balance of trade and balance of payments. In 1985 the U.S. became, for the first time since the beginning of this century,the world's biggest debtor: in 1987 its foreign debt amounted to 368 billion dollars.

There thus developed an immense gap between the United States' ability to satisfy its international obligations and maintain the status of the dollar as the reserve currency, on the one hand, and the dollar's actual role in the international currency and crediting system, on the other. Over 70 per cent of all international accounts are settled in U.S. dollars, of which sum the U.S. proper, its economic and financial potential being what it is, accounts for barely a quarter.



Reluctant creditors

Another reason why the dollar–dominated currency system has done the world economy more harm than good is that it has afforded the U.S. a unique opportunity to exploit the other IMF member states. Because it could settle with other countries in its national currency, the U.S. felt safe to let its balance of payment deficits grow from year to year. It did not have to spend its foreign currency or gold reserves covering this deficit. The dollar-dominated international currency system enables Washington and American private companies to spend much more money abroad than the U.S. actually earns by exporting its goods and services – in effect, to live beyond the country's means. As a result, all those linked to the international money market have become U.S. creditors against their will.

According to the Soviet economist Dmitry Smyslov, the total sum of forced credits caused by the United States covering its chronic balance of payments deficit in dollars increased from 8.9 billion dollars in 1950 to 543 billion in 1984.

Another way of redistributing other countries' national wealth in its favour is by manipulating the dollar exchange rate. Since the seventies, when Western currencies started to float, U.S. ruling circles have been trying to boost the competitiveness of their goods by bringing the dollar down. This "currency dumping" has helped increase American export and temporarily strengthened the U.S. position on the international market. However, the depreciation of the dollar has a seamy side to it. The dollar has lost much of its importance as a means of international account settlement, undermining the United States' currency supremacy and its standing in the financial competition with the Common Market and Japan. For this reason, strengthening the dollar is now high on the Reagan administration's list of priorities.

There is another reason for this. Washington needed additional sources of financing for its new arms race spiral. In order to fund new arms programmes, the American financial authorities started borrowing from the international money market, thus running an ever higher federal debt. In the eighties, the U.S. government debt soared to 2.3 trillion dollars. But for financial incentives, the Reagan administration would hardly have been able to borrow so much money abroad. In the early eighties Washington started pushing up the lending rate again in another round of dollar manipulations. The rise of the dollar promoted the sale of U.S. Treasury bonds abroad, with the buyers in fact financing America's ambitious arms programmes, and attracted more foreign investments to the U.S. economy, which largely helped it "to raise the steam."

At the New York Times' estimate, the U.S. pumped about 170 billion dollars out of Western Europe, 120 billion out of

Canada and 90 billion out of Japan thanks to increased lending rates between January 1980 and June 1984. Altogether, America's dollar intake amounted to 417 billion over those years. The total sum of foreign capital to have flowed into the U.S. by 1987 was estimated at 500-odd billion dollars.

Besides everything else, the high dollar helped the U.S. save money on imports. On the other hand, Western Europe and Japan had to pay more for it as their currencies declined. Western Europe's three biggest oil importers – the F.R.G., France and Italy – lost no less than 6-7 billion dollars a year each, for instance.

Towards the mid–eighties, however, the gains from the high dollar exchange rate began to give way to losses. Then Washington tried to manipulate the dollar again, as it had done in the seventies, by devaluing it. The Reagan administration regarded that as the only way to improve the competitiveness of American exports, cut the foreign trade deficit and stimulate export–oriented industries. The new round of currency dumping led to a situation where the dollar fell to less than half against the Japanese yen and the F.R.G. mark.

Facelifting

"When the dollar fell to its lowest level against both currencies in the postwar era," Time magazine wrote, "concern was giving way to something akin to panic as the world reacted to the continuing disintegration of the monetary consensus that had been achieved by the Western allies during the closing days of World War II."

The lamentable position of the dollar and the "disintegration of the monetary consensus" mark the apotheosis of the American approach to modern currency problems, which the U.S. regards as essentially political problems. But then the international currency system is not a political alliance. It should be based not on "consensus" but on a universal economic foundation, and its strength should not depend either on a government's foreign policy and ideological whims, or on alterations in the situation on the business scene. As has already been mentioned, the IMF's currency system came to depend on them for the sole reason that King Dollar – and, consequently, the Bretton Woods system as a whole – had had an Achilles' heel from the outset.

That the domination of the dollar was the worst flaw in the international currency system had been indicated by Western economists as early as twenty years ago. Never before, however, had it done such damage to the world economy or threatened it with such enormous upheavals. Hence the current Western tendency towards a radical restructuring of the currency system.

The U.S. is countering this tendency with a tactic of minor reforms aimed at preserving the leading role of the dollar in the IMF currency system and its advantages to America. Under pressure from Washington, the measures being taken to facelift the dollar–dominated currency system have become a subject of heated debate amongst the leading Western countries.

The question of reforming the Bretton Woods system was initially raised by the French delegation to the first Big Seven conference in Rambouillet, France, in 1975. At that time, however, the reform consisted in dealing with currency troubles – specifically, in trying to bring the floating currency rates under control, fighting inflation, and taking austerity measures. The talk about the need for reform was resumed in the early eighties when by making the dollar "more expensive" the United States had aggravated its currency differences with Japan and the EEC, as well as those between the West and the developing countries. Currency problems were on the agendas of the Big Seven summits in Versailles (1982), Williamsburg (1983), and London (1984). France insisted on holding a new Bretton Woods conference aimed at reforming the currency system. Under pressure from Washington, however, the Seven only agreed on the need to "study" the question and formed a "group of financial wizards" that drowned it in talk.

The further aggravation of the dollar crisis in the mid-eighties compelled the White House to take a more flexible stand at the Tokyo Conference of the Seven (1986). The U.S. professed its agreement to a restructuring of the currency system and discussion of it at a broadly representative international forum. What this verbal consent actually amounted to became obvious at the Venice summit in 1987. Instead of a radical reform, the White House suggested "the coordination of domestic economic policies and making them compatible on the international arena." By "coordination" it meant chiefly measures for state-monopoly control over business conditions. Japan and F.R.G. were supposed to stimulate their national economies so as to assume the role of the West's "economic locomotives" and save the world capitalist economy from the impending slump.

Thus, without rejecting the idea of currency reform in principle, the U.S. still hopes in this way to buy time in an attempt to improve its foreign economic position thanks to a cheap dollar and the maintenance of a currency system based on its supremacy. As ever, Washington is seeking to keep the dollar afloat and retain its relative currency stability at its allies' expense. Because the depreciation of the dollar is damaging to the United States' rivals, they are compelled to carry out currency interventions (to buy up dollars when the dollar exchange rate falls). They are forced to do so because every sharp depreciation of the dollar does damage to their export trade and hits many export–oriented industries hard.

These measures, however, offer the IMF system no guarantees against financial chaos, because enormous masses of speculative capital are circulating on international credit markets. In order to prevent the crisis from getting worse, five leading Western countries (the U.S., Japan, the F.R.G., Britain and France) signed the so-called Louvre Accord in Paris in February 1987, providing for joint measures to stabilize currency exchange rates. Contrary to expectations, the Accord has failed to rectify the currency situation, as evidenced by the currency and stock exchange panics last autumn and earlier this year.

Even if all the signatories to the Louvre Accord take the measures it provides for, they are unlikely to attain even the modest objective of guaranteeing minimum financial stability. After all, the agreement is only another facelifting operation on a currency system which has been effectively inoperative for the past twelve years.

The leading Western countries' adherence to dollar supremacy has thus become the chief obstacle to overcoming the grave crisis in which the international currency system has found itself. So where is the way out of the impasse?

Photo from the British Economist

French Connection

Karen Karagezyan

Where does the Channel tunnel lead to

To obtain the latest information about a behind-the-scenes affair, the press sometimes provokes highly-placed officials into making public comments on it, and this reaction provides some indication of what is going on. A few days ago the London newspaper The Sunday Times carried the headline "Britain backs out of French missile deal."

Let me explain what the story was about. In the opinion of NATO military experts, the 200-odd atomic free-falling bombs maintained in British arsenals are becoming obsolete, and it is planned to have them replaced by the end of the nineties.

An appropriate air-to-ground missile has been devised in France, and some months ago London and Paris started talks on using it as the basis for developing a missile for the British Air Force. But since then the French government has changed, and former Defence Minister André Giraud, a represenative of the right, has been replaced by the Socialist Jean-Pierre Chevènement. The Sunday Times sent up a ballon d'essai to find out whether or not the French attitude to the joint project had changed.

The answer came on the same day. The British government denied the rumour that it had refused to discuss the new project with France. It turned out that George Younger, the British Secretary of State for Defence and his French counterpart Jean-Pierre Chevènement had exchanged views on the matter in July of this year. Such a prompt reaction betrayed the interest of the British defence ministry in military cooperation with France.

The last few months have seen many new developments in this field. The Anglo-French summit at the beginning of the year almost caused a sensation. The Daily Telegraph said at the time that Britain and France had taken the experts by suprise by announcing a package of military cooperation measures on a much wider scale than had been expected.

Here are a few provisions of the relevant accords. For the first time in the 22 years since France's withdrawal from NATO integrated command, British troops have been allowed to carry out exercises on French soil. They can even pass through French territory for operations against the enemy in the event of mobilization in West Germany. French atomic submarines have been allowed to call at British ports.

At the above-mentioned summit, the British and French leaders again discussed the question of building an airborne missile. Some time earlier, the two defence ministers had signed an agreement on the defence of the Channel tunnel and its use for military purposes.

How are we to explain such intensive military rapprochement?

In Western Europe, only France and Britain possess nuclear weapons. Though they have given notional support to the idea of nuclear arms reduction, both countries flatly refuse to join this process, and appear to be afraid to pronounce the word "reduction," even in the long term.

Those opposed to scrapping NATO's nuclear weapons seem to be thinking about possible ways of weakening the trend towards disarmament. Mrs Thatcher once said that she was interested in a world without war, not in a world without nuclear weapons. The House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs recently voiced its concern by stating: "The alliance (NATO) faces a further problem – how to maintain public support for defence spending when the Soviet Union's image is softening." It was particularly worried by the fact that "further strategic arms talks might have to involve the British and French nuclear forces."

In a report presented by the Select Committee, the concept of a threat is defined in a really innovative way. It is not the danger of war or the nuclear arms race, and not even the "Soviet menace." The new formula says: "Progress towards genuine arms control is fraught with potential dangers for the NATO alliance." In the opinion of the authors of the report, the INF treaty creates more problems than it solves.

André Giraud, until recently France's Defence Minister, expressed his attitude to the treaty even more trenchantly by saying he was not among those who welcomed this "European Munich." It will be recalled that President Mitterrand has reaffirmed his support for the Soviet-American treaty, though not a word has been said as to when France would at last participate in the nuclear disarmament process.

There is no harm in recalling Munich, and the comparison is justified, but in a quite different sense. In Munich, British and French statesmen yielded, to say the least, to the main source of danger to Europe – the policy of strength pursued by nazi Germany. Today, a lethal threat is above all being created by the nuclear arms race. The question arises: will Britain and France give in to the inertia of nuclear thinking? Will they accept the dubious "nuclear guarantees?" Guarantees of this kind do not increase trust or reduce confrontation and hence the danger of war. Britain and France, whether separately or together, could make a tangible contribution towards ending the confrontation.

It is to be hoped that the Channel tunnel will never link the flanks of the western front in a European theatre.

George Bush's "upward mobility"

The National Convention of the Republican Party in New Orleans elected George Bush as the party's candidate for the presidency. An account of the conventions of the two main political parties in the United States will be given in our next issue. Here our correspondent introduces the presidential candidate.

During his recent visit to the U.S.S.R. President Ronald Reagan remarked that if the man he would like to see in the White House won the election in November the policy of steady improvement of Soviet-American relations would continue. The President did not mention the name of the man. Nor was there any need to do so considering that the party's watchword has for some time now been "George Bush for president!"

In drawing a political portrait of the Republican standard-bearer you discover that it is no simple matter to pinpoint those characteristics of this contender to the presidency that would explain the "George Bush phenomenon." His seven and a half years in the vice-presidency have earned Bush the reputation of a "competent" and "accomplished" statesman with a long and successful record in politics. He appears to hold all the trumps – experience, the respect of his party colleagues, the best-organized election campaign, and excellent financial standing. To round out the picture – a war veteran, a loving husband and a good father.

The "personal element" undoubtedly plays a part in politics. In this respect the present contestants, both Republican and Democrat, have to reckon with the influence on the public mind of the "Reagan era." It is unlikely that after the Irangate disclosures, the stock market perturbations, the persistent national debt and federal budget deficit, his successor will inherit the artificially contrived Reagan image that was associated with the coming of a "new dawn for America."

Important too is another factor which was noted by the well-known American historian Arthur Schlesinger. The time for a messianic foreign policy, the time of the God-given role of the United States as the saviour of mankind, is coming to an end, he wrote. Reaganism is on the way out, the circle is closing, and the time for radical change in the course steered by the country is approaching.

It is perhaps too early to say that the pendulum of American politics, which swung to the right after the Vietnam war and the disappointments of the 1970s, will swing sharply in the opposite direction. But there is no doubt that it has already shifted to the centre.

The complex processes at work in public thinking to some extent explain why George Bush has a real chance of becoming the next president.

Up the ladder, rung by rung

George Herbert Walker Bush was born on April 12, 1924, in Milton, Massachusetts, his father, Prescott Sheldon Bush and his mother, Dorothy (Walker) Bush. Bush Senior was for a long time Greenwich town moderator, and later, for 10 years, U.S. senator. Thus the present vice-president belongs by birth to the now almost extinct eastern wing of the Republican Party establishment. In the respectable, deeply religious Bush family, modesty, self-restraint and respect for one's elders were the rules of conduct. After graduating in 1942 at the Phillips Military Academy in Andover, Mass., young George went to the front to serve with the naval air forces of the 3rd and 5th U.S. fleets. Demobilized in 1945 in the rank of lieutenant, he enrolled at Yale, one of the most prestigious American universities, where he graduated with a bachelor's degree in economics. The career of a Wall Street clerk evidently did not appeal to him. He decided to go into business himself, and left for the oil fields of Texas. He prospered here and before long was president of the Zapata Off Shore Company which he founded.

The future vice-president ran a successful business until 1966, when he sold his company. However, politics had already begun to loom large in his life in the late 1950s.

He started out as a Republican Party activist in Houston. In 1963 and 1964 he

was chairman of the Republican Party in the state of Texas, he was a delegate to the Republican national conventions in 1964 and 1968, ran for the Senate in 1964 and in 1966 was elected to Congress from Texas.

Further steps in his ascent in the party hierarchy brought him in 1973-74 to the post of chairman of the National Committee of the Republican Party. Bush's service record includes the posts of U.S. United Nations ambassador (1971-72), chief of U.S. Liaison Office in Peking (1974-75) and director of the CIA in 1976-77. He was elected vice-president of the U.S.A. twice, in 1980 and in 1984.

When he was asked in 1970, after the failure of his second attempt to get elected to the Senate, why he had stood for election, Bush described his political aspirations as "upward mobility." It is possible that his election slogans at that time were not definitive enough and that he lacked consistency in pursuing his principles and all other qualities that would have set him apart from the general run of candidates. The same vagueness of political image is still characteristic of the present candidate for the presidency. The zigzags in his public pronouncements have given critics grounds for accusing him of inconsistency, and at times dismay even his most loyal supporters. One of his backers in the 1980 presidential election, observed that Bush did not have a clear idea of what course America ought to steer.

The "Maybe" Contender

One of the subtler aspects of U.S. election campaign is the choice of the vice-presidential candidate. He must accentuate, so to speak, the qualities of the contender for the presidency. The successful distribution of roles between Ronald Reagan, who was swept into the White House on a wave of conservative and chauvinistic sentiment, and the self-possessed, good fellow and outstanding executive George Bush yielded dividends to both of them.

On the one hand, this choice had smoothed over the differences between the ultra-right wing of the Republicans, which had sponsored Reagan, and the more moderates. Moreover, according to Washington Post, "Reagan realized that Bush – unlike first choice Gerald Ford – would gracefully and gratefully accept the subservience the post demands."

In accepting "the subservience," Bush by no means abandoned his former ambitions, the more so that the aureole of popularity that surrounded Reagan extended to Bush as well.

Bush is hypersensitive to the slightest suspicion of liberalism on his part. A product of the eastern establishment which represents the "moderate" tradition, Bush, from the very beginning of his political career, has had to reckon with the powerful influence of the right wing. Hence his striving to iron out differences and emphatically to deny the existence of any kind of confrontation within the party.

In connection with Bush's appointment as U.N. ambassador, someone wisecracked that despite his lack of political experience, Bush would make an



ideal diplomat "because he always says 'maybe' when he means 'yes' or 'no.'"

In my opinion it would be an oversimplification to assume that the vice-president wants to be in everybody's good books, and to say he is haunted by fear of criticism from the right. However, he surprised very many of his friends when he suddenly began to sing the praises of the fundamentalist preacher Jerry Falwell and the late publisher William Loeb who had at one time attacked him. It is hard to say whether the present presidental candidate will be able to cope with the role of "political glue" the President performed so successfully until recently. Bush himself evidently simply does not want to rock the boat. Especially now that the right is very much displeased with Reagan for signing the treaty on medium and shorter-range missiles and for his behaviour at the Moscow summit.

In his childhood Bush earned the nickname of "Have Half" because of his invariable readiness to share his goodies with others. And now, too, the doubts voiced by the Right camp about whether "Have Half would be too willing to share with the Russians" sound a warning for George Bush.

The experience of the Team B

Incidentally, in the general chorus of bellicose statements Bush has always made his voice heard. Moreover the fact can hardly be overlooked that it was precisely during the years when he headed the CIA that the policy of departure from détente crystallized in the upper echelons of the administration.

For the intelligence department itself that was an extremely troubled time. The scandalous revelations of the subversive activities of the cloak-and-dagger artists continued unabated. A new man with an unblemished reputation was needed to mollify the public opinion. On the other hand, that man had to be strong enough to cement the slightly shaken ranks of the agency. No small role was to be played by the respectability and diplomatic skill of the new director, his ability to patch up relations with America's Western allies who were seriously alarmed by the wave of revelations about CIA doings.

A curious episode is related by the Sovietologist Richard Pipes notorious for his rightist views. In 1976, he says, certain well-informed persons began to be worried that the great hopes pinned on limiting the arms drive,hopes engendered by the so-called Interim Agreement were not being realized, since the Soviet Union was building and deploying a whole complex of new systems of strategic weapons which could give it strength beyond the limits of parity. According to Pipes, these doubts were voiced also by the presidential Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, which appreared to be particularly concerned over the fact that the National Intelligence Estimate, prepared by the CIA, had understated for years both the intensity and scale of the Soviet strategic arms buildup effort.

On discovering such a "blunder" and, of course, in the interests of "absolute objectivity," Bush sanctioned the conduct of an experiment in "comparative analysis." Together with Team A, which was engaged in preparing current National Intelligence Estimate, Team B, headed by Pipes, was given access to the same data. Richard Pipes admitted that he was no expert in the sphere of armaments, his job, he said, was to work out a broader political approach to the problem with the object of probing the meaning of the Soviet Union's efforts in

the sphere of nuclear weapons, i.e.,to view these efforts in the broader context of Soviet political and military strategy. The more limited special task of Team B was assigned to a small group of experts, which included Paul Nitze, former Deputy Secretary of Defence, General Daniel O. Graham (Ret.), former Defence Intelligence Agency chief and Professor William van Cleave (member of the American delegation at the SALT-1 talks).

Their report submitted in December 1976 was confidential. However rumors about it leaked at once into the press. Richard Pipes, being compelled to say something to the general public, responded with an article which appeared in the journal Commentary in July 1977, asking why the Soviet Union believed it could wage and win a nuclear war.

Pipes did not hide the fact that his article, which was based on non-confidential data, in effect contained the same conclusions as the secret report. These boiled down to recommending the U.S. to adopt an "effective" nuclear strategy, inasmuch as while the U.S. regarded the nuclear weapon as a deterrent, the Russians saw it as a means of "prodding," with all the consequences ensuing therefrom. Therefore the reorientation of U.S. strategy made the whole process of SALT talks "superfluous." It is indicative that in his statements of this period too Bush intimated that the SALT-2 treaty gave the military advantage to the U.S.S.R. and hence could not "control and deter the Russians."

The timing of the secret report and the fact that information about it promptly appeared in the press, causing something of an uproar, combined with the article in the Commentary, created the impression of a well-planned and skillfully executed operation. The only thing that might have irked the ultra-right was that in 1977 their hour had not yet struck, the pendulum of American politics was only just beginning to move to the right. The swing was completed in the early 1980s. Not for nothing did Pipes himself write with pride in 1981 that if his article immediately after its publication was resented by many, today his ideas seemed less radical than they did then. However that may be, in this writer's opinion it was precisely the theses of the Team B report at the time of Bush's directorship and Pipes' article, that provided the propaganda cover for the campaign to discredit disarmament agreements with the Soviet Union and the SALT-2 treaty, became the signal for the beginning of a new spiral in the arms race.

And here is Bush today:

In an interview published in the Republican journal First Monday, the 1988 presidential candidate George Bush said: "For 20 years I have faced the Soviets in both the diplomatic and intelligence arenas. I understand their goals and their methods from firsthand experience. Further arms control is possible, but it will require strength, stability, sound judgement and patience. As President, I will never be afraid to reach out for peace, but I will do it with my eyes wide open. A President must always negotiate from a position of strength, and I always will."

Even the vice-president's most outspoken ill-wishers could hardly find any grounds for accusing him of being a "softie" when it comes to policy towards the U.S.S.R. Here he is above suspicion and more consistent than in anything else. Besides which, as distinct from the Democrats, he holds all the trump cards. "For years, the goal of negotiations with the Soviets has been arms control. We reached several agreements that limited how quickly we could stockpile nuclear weapons. But our Administration made a breakthrough. We were able to achieve an arms reduction agreement." Here is a convenient opportunity to tell off his Democrat opponents in Congress. "The Democratic Congress must stop making unilateral concessions that undercut American security and, ultimately, the cause of peace. The Democrats must stop trying to give away in Washington what we are negotiating with in Geneva."

Nevertheless what commands attention in this part of Bush's election platform is not so much the emphasis on strong-arm rhetoric as a striving to publicize the present administration's achievements in the field of disarmament and improvement of relations with the Soviet Union. Bush speaks of readiness to stand by the treaty on medium- and shorter-range missiles and to negotiate the conclusion of a carefully prepared and verifiable agreement on chemical weapons and conventional armaments along with an agreement on strategic offensive weapons.

In his election speeches he often talks about "economic growth and opportunities for every American" and about a "return to traditional values." Irving Kristol of the New York Times Magazine was perhaps right when he wrote that "what the Reagan Administration has not been able to do is articulate any kind of comprehensive conservative viewpoint." Bush is thoroughly of a piece with that administration. With his rare gift for sensing impending political changes in the party and his extraordinary ability to balance between the different groupings, it is understandable that his candidature suits most Republicans. Those who would be happy to benefit opportunistically from the rising tide of evangelical Christianity but are a lot more comfortable

In the period from August 15 to September 15 organizations and institutions are invited to take in subscriptions for the Bulletin of the Foreign Ministry of the U.S.S.R. for 1989.

This is an official publication of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It carries official information on current Soviet foreign policy. Many important foreign policy documents, including speeches by Party and government leaders, as well as Foreign Ministry statements are to be found in this bulletin only.

A wealth of illustrations, unique information, and high printing quality make it a much-sought-after publication in and outside the Soviet Union. The reader will find in it the chronicle of work of the Foreign Ministry, up-to-date information, accounts of briefings and press conferences, and hitherto unpublished documents.

The bulletin in recommended to diplomats, staff members in research institutes and departments of social sciences at colleges, journalists specializing in foreign affairs, lecturers, librarians, people working in the political and economic education system and all those interested in Soviet foreign policy.

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in the board room than in church. And also those who might be called the new Republican activists. It is the latter who will determine the face of the party in the future. Hence the generalized formulations calculated to please everybody. Some experts call the present administration a "transitional" one. Well, perhaps that is precisely why fortune has smiled on George Bush.

Popularity polls

The mood of the American voter is variable, the results of the regular opinion polls can be misleading. However, it would doubtless be a mistake not to take note of them. Until quite recently Bush was always in the lead, with about half of the electorate in his favour. And this despite the fact that approximately the same number of those polled considered that the vice-president had not told the whole truth about the Iran-contras deal. Now the situation has changed. According to the latest opinion polls, his rival, Michael Dukakis, has made considerable headway and is so far in the lead.

This has prompted the Republican candidate to change his tactics, laying the emphasis on his "disagreements" with the White House incumbent. True, this is more like a chess move designed to display firmness and add to his popularity at one go.

It is hardly surprising that on foreign policy issues Bush's position coincides with that of the President – he promises, if elected, to remain an active proponent of SDI and to seek further increases in U.S. military spending.

Bush is all for continuing military aid to the Nicaraguan contras. In the matter of a Middle East settlement he does not rule out the possibility of an international conference with American participation. He is opposed to sanctions against South Africa, but does not exclude coming out himself against apartheid.

And so, only one rung separates George Bush from the goal to which he has so persistently aspired. Will he succeed in reaching that topmost point in his "upward mobility"?

Mikhail Svetlichny

Photo from First Monday journal (U.S.A.)

CHILE

A sect of butchers

The colony founded by religious fanatics from the F.R.G. and turned into a torture camp is named, of all things, "Dignidad" (dignity).

This incredible story has its beginning back in the fifties. Preachers Paul Schäfer and Hugo Baar put together a group of Baptists and built a home for orphans in the small town of Heide on the Rhine. The children of members of the sect were kept there in quasi-military conditions. Only a year after the opening of the home, the police began to receive reports that Schäfer was forcing the children into unlawful sexual relations and humiliating them. In 1961 a warrant was issued for his arrest.

For a short time Schäfer went into hiding. Then, in 1962, with 300 followers he left Federal Germany and moved to Chile, where he settled about 280 kms south of the capital, Santiago. Schäfer promised to found a colony like those set up by the first Christians. Soon, however, it was clear that instead of following Christian teachings, he followed those of the late fuehrer. The camp was surrounded by a double barbed wire fence, and the teachings of the head of the sect could be summed up in one sentence: "By your work you serve God."

That phrase was a cover for the sadistic system prevailing in the camp, which destroyed a person's individuality and turned him into a slave. Those who managed to escape were unanimous in saying that the working conditions were those of slavery.

The colonists were made to work 12-14 hours a day, without any days off. They were not allowed any private life. Everything had to be reported to Schäfer himself. The rule was that if anyone had done or said anything wrong, not only was he guilty, but so was the one who knew about it and had failed to report him. As a result, an atmosphere of mutual mistrust and constant spying on each other reigned in the colony.

Attempts to escape were rarely successful, as the Chilean authorities took Schäfer's side. More often than not, escapees were returned to the colony. That was the case with Jurgen Szurgelies. In mid-April of this year he was captured at a farm some 20 kms from the colony, and the manager turned him over to the police. They got in touch with "Dignidad," and in a couple of hours men with dogs arrived to take him back...

Schäfer enforced a system of sexual abstinence in the colony: husbands and wives were separated and sexual contacts allowed only with the permission of the leader of the sect. This rule did not apply to him. Hugo Baar, who escaped from the colony in 1985 and had been a member of the leadership, testified that "in Schäfer's room one of the twin beds was invariably occupied by a so-called sprinter. Schäfer had two sprinters – one aged about 20 and a second of between 10 and 15. If the younger one was sharing his bed, the elder slept in the dormitory with his group. Everyone in the colony knew about this, but it aroused no protest since no one dared think ill of Schäfer."

Hugo Baar also spoke of maltreatment of the children: "I am now alarmed and anxious because Dr Seewald, who is not a medical practitioner, has, on instructions from Schäfer, who has no medical qualifications, been applying electric-shock treatment absolutely uncontrolled to children. What makes it even worse in that this applies not to the mentally ill, but to completely healthy children."

When General Pinochet came to power in 1973, the sect began to flourish. Schäfer's relations with the military regime were excellent. Soon the dictator himself visited the colony. In August 1974 it was visited by a secret police agent, Samuel Fuenzalido Devia. Later he deserted and provided important evidence at the hearing that Amnesty International has been conducting against "Dignidad" for over 10 years.

Certain politicians from the Bavarian Christian Social Union support the colony. Dieter Huber, who was for many years a foreign policy reviewer, was twice received in the colony with honours usually accorded to a head of state, while Wolfgang Vogelsgesang who sits on the Munich Municipal Council for the CSU makes regular trips to the German enclave in Chile. Only when the public

"Dignidad" and its leader Paul Schäfer. *Photo from Stern magazine*

learned many details about life there did comments on the subject in Bavaria become more objective.

In 1976 a report issued by the U.N. Human Rights Commission revealed that the Chilean secret police had a secret torture centre in the colony. The exposures were made by Amnesty International and the West German magazine Stern.

But it was only in 1985 that the Federal Germany's Foreign Ministry asked its ambassador in Santiago to check the facts. The ambassador met a member of the Junta, the Commander of the Chilean Carabineri Corps General Rodolfo Stange, who is known to be a close friend of Schäfer (incidentally, the leader of the sect is an honorary carabinero and the flag of the Chilean carabineri flies over the colony). The General's reply was predictable: he told the ambassador that no punishable offences on the part of the leadership of the "Dignidad" colony had been found.

In 1987 the colony again hit the headlines. Federal Germany's Foreign Minister Genscher had demanded an inquiry into all the aspects of its activities. The colony was visited by a Chilean judge and two Amnesty International lawyers. As the Chairman of the West German brach of Amnesty International, Röverkamp, later told a press conference, the visit confirmed previous evidence from a variety of sources of torture in the colony.

In February of this year a public hearing was held on the "Dignidad" affair. The Bonn authorities were prompted to such action by the refusal of the colony's leadership to allow an F.R.G. Foreign Ministry delegation into the colony, and lack of cooperation by the Chilean authorities.

Four former members of the colony were invited to the hearings. They said that the ideological values which were supposed to have become a thing of the past with the Third Reich were still alive and well in the colony. Psychotropic methods were used to brainwash people and turn them into zombies without wills of their own. Children were being sexually abused, and in the first years of the Pinochet dictatorship the DINA secret police had tortured political prisoners in the colony, using them as guinea pigs in perfecting torture techniques. Only very few of the prisoners had managed to survive and leave that hell.

After the hearing, the "Dignidad" leadership tried to pose as the victim of a "Marxist conspiracy." But the investigation was taken seriously. Schäfer and some of his closest followers applied for Chilean citizenship to avoid being extradited to the F.R.G. And their request would not have been turned down had it not been for the intervention of the F.R.G. consul. It is being said that the leaders of the sect are considering moving to a new place – South Africa or Australia. Back in 1970, when Salvador Allende won the elections, Schäfer and his followers were already getting ready to leave Chile and had even bought land in neighbouring Argentina. Then times changed...

One of the few Chileans who dares openly expose the sect is Bishop Carlos Camus. It was he who told the press that the Chilean secret police were keeping Chilean citizens prisoner in the colony and torturing them there. Bishop Camus believes that the "Dignidad" affair will not be fully exposed until Chile's principal problem has been resolved – the restoration of democracy.

Verner Hörtner,
Austrian journalist

Grass roots

It was the first ever dialogue between official and citizen diplomats, and it took place not in an official venue, but in a workshop at the Moscow Orjonikidze Engineering Plant, where Soviet Foreign Ministry chiefs answered questions from the floor.

What is citizen diplomacy? At the get–together the concept was described as being like grass planted on the hillsides of official diplomacy, its numerous roots holding the earth in place.

Everything that is ersatz dies. Everything is natural lives and goes from strength to strength. Emerging during the cold war, citizen diplomacy is spreading throughout the world influencing minds and governments alike.

"Don't interfere in serious politics," officials only recently reproached intractable activists, workers, writers and students. But the rebukes went unheeded. People were aware of the impending threat of war, ecological catastrophe, a runaway nuclear arms race. They put forward numerous suggestions. They acted.

Let's organize a peace walk, they suggested. Some 250 Americans along with thousands of Soviet citizens walked all the way from Leningrad to Moscow, stopping over in towns and communities to chat with complete strangers. It was not an easy business. Some of the Americans were sure they would have to "run the gauntlet" of militiamen protecting them from chance encounters. Some pundits in our country would have done that to "provide against contingencies". The "gauntlet" was dispensed with and nothing untoward occurred. On the contrary, there were exciting dialogues, campfire sing-songs, invitations to pop in for cups of tea, and talk without end... talk about peace, friendship and mutual understanding.

At a 35.000-strong Soviet–American rally and recital those same "pundits" suggested assigning guards and dog–handlers. Again the offer was refused. This was a friendship recital, they were told. Again everything passed off without incident. And the stereotypes came tumbling down.

Let us draft joint projects, they suggested. In this connection I recalled a conference between representatives of the Soviet Peace Committee and the Soviet-American Dialogue Centre at which for the first time there was no finger-pointing, but on the contrary, a search for points of contact and venues for concrete action. They proposed building a school in a third country with the money to be donated by both sides, and a school was soon built in Nicaragua. They suggested making a joint film on how to overcome the stereotypes and do away with the "enemy image." They proposed convening a rally of 100 Soviet soldiers and 100 GIs, not officers, but ordinary privates, who would sit round one table, look each other straight in the eye and talk about their girls and mothers back home, or perhaps even play a game of soccer, and all to see each other otherwise than through rifle sights.

They also suggested organizing delegations, parallel with the Helsinki process, to be made up of ordinary people; not politicians, but schoolteachers, housewives, farmers and engineers, men and women from 35 countries, who might not know what an SS-20 missile is but who could put their heads together to consider what can be done to make everyone in our common European home happy.

Citizen diplomacy is so vigorous and is showing such initiative today that it is outstripping official diplomacy.

At the meeting at the plant, it was also noticed that the Ministry had likewise done a lot. Gifted young men and women were being boldly promoted to take over from the older generation of diplomats. The paramount criteria now were initiative, dynamism, flexibility and the ability to take account of the interests of one's partners, as well as a desire not to mark time but to advance and offer new and original solutions to complex political problems. Yet without imprudent haste. As the poet said: "When you blundered, the entire country blundered."

The new political thinking in foreign policy, along with the new criteria and approaches to it, have graphically demonstrated the power and significance of citizen diplomacy. It is absolutely obvious today that the two diplomacies must complement each other, pooling efforts to increase mutual understanding between peoples and strengthen peace on earth.

The dialogue was keynoted by confidence. It was a dialogue between friends with a real stake in the issues. It was an exchange of views, and brisk discussion of the more urgent issues of contemporary world affairs and Soviet foreign policy. Soviet POWs in Afghanistan, disarmament, the prospects for Soviet–American relations, China's border claims and the "blank spots" in Soviet history were only some of the many questions that the factory workers put to the diplomats. "With an audience like that, one has to be sincere and honest, and not take refuge in equivocation," observed Yuli Vorontsov, First Deputy U.S.S.R. Minister of Foreign Affairs. "We find such get–togethers extremely useful. Let more proposals, initiatives and questions be raised. By pulling together, we shall try to implement them."

Citizen diplomacy. At the plant it was demonstrated in action. In response to a proposal from the floor, a general statement was adopted condemning the U.S. actions that had resulted in the tragic shooting down of the Iranian airliner in the Persian Gulf.

Vladimir Galin

How to make the peasant his own master

Perestroika is in its fourth year, but the collective farms have yet to be granted their promised independence

If you want to have an idea of the Podolye area – fertile lands between the rivers Dniester and Southern Bug in the Ukraine – remember a Ukrainian proverb which may sound clumsy in translation but does create a vivid enough picture: "In Podolye they have loaves of bread on hedges and the hedges are made from sausages." The local people are known for their tendency to boast and exaggerate but, on the other hand, if a proverb exists there must be some ground for it. Indeed, the soil in Podolye is very fertile (another local saying is: "You plant a shaft and get a horse carriage") and the climate is moderate, with a mild winter and warm, but not hot summer; also there is an ideal amount of moisture in the soil (550-600 mm of precipitation a year). In short it is one of the few places in the world where nature favours the farmer and bestows its bounties on him. Four-fifths of the population in Podolye (including its heart, the Khmelnitsky Area) live in the countryside and engage in farming. Food is the biggest urban industry.

All the more surprising is the situation in the food shops in Khmelnitsky which, by the way, is better supplied than other towns in the area. Supplies of meat and butter in the state shops are erratic, and the few kinds of sausages available attract huge queues. The shops of the consumer cooperatives are better stocked, but meat is twice as expensive. In the market supplies are more plentiful, but the prices are three times higher than in the state shops, well beyond what the average citizen can afford.

The local people have had more than their share of hardship. There are those who remember the famine in the early 1930s. People of my age who grew up during the war remember the lean 1940s. Things did not begin to improve until after 1953. Life today seems almost a paradise compared to the past. There is enough bread. Whole buckwheat grain cannot be got for love or money. But rice, a selection of cereals and macaroni are available. In the last two years, there has been no problem with dairy products. Forty years ago one could only dream of such things. And yet as you wait in the queue at the meat stall you find yourself thinking not of the way things were forty years ago but of what people have – and don't have! – today.

A strange paradox: such a fertile land and such a paucity of food.

I have often been to this place and I have asked myself this question. Formerly, however, it was, so to speak, a rhetorical question. You were talking to yourself, as it were, and it was largely to yourself that you addressed the indignant and puzzled question: "Why? How long will things go on like this?" Now, it seems, these questions may be asked without the earlier note of desperation, in a calm and practical manner: "Why? When will things begin to improve?" Then, finding a sensible solution, we'll be able to put things right.

This being so, I decided to go to the place where they could give me an authoritative and competent answer – to the Regional Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine.

Taking the bull by the horns

I don't like it when all people are tarred with the same brush. Even during the years of "stagnation" I met officials who worked conscientiously, shunned window dressing and fanfare and did their best to advance what we now call perestroika. More often than not these were the agrarians – managers of collective and state farms, economic and Party officials from the regional to the national level.

Among such people was Nikolai Rudyuk: his true Ukrainian coolheadedness and thoroughness inspired trust and respect.

Nikolai Rudyuk is a little over fifty. He comes from a local peasant family. He started his career as an agronomist on a collective farm. Then he became a Komsomol official, and since 1963 he has been a Party official in the Khmelnitsky Area. For the past five years he has been secretary of the regional Party committee. I put all my questions to him without mincing my words as we had discussed the problem of meat frankly many times before.

The questions did not offend him or take him by surprise. He gave me two reference documents: On measures to increase meat production in the Khmelnitsky Area and On improving the nutrition of the population in 1988: columns of figures, calculations, percentages, funds and quotas.

Judging from the documents, the situation is improving. It is not by chance that the report to the 19th Party conference named the Khmelnitsky Area among the few regions in the country where "people got down to business energetically," where "the output of livestock products is steadily growing, bringing noticeable improvements in food supply."

This is true. Suffice it to say that the area is far ahead of the national average as far as the per capita consumption of milk is concerned (370 litres per annum versus 343 litres), has exceeded the target set by the Food Programme (330-340 litres) and has every chance of achieving the level recommended by the medical science (405 litres) before the end of the 1980s. These are marked improvements.

The meat situation is far more complex, although supplies to the national and republican fund are growing annually and the amount of meat in the market even exceeds the plan targets.

Three factors are seen as crucial for the growth of the overall and marketable output: 1) specialized livestock farms run on an industrial basis, 2) "meat shops" in every farm, irrespective of its chief specialization, and 3) individual farms contracting to supply cattle to collective and state farms.

So, things are looking up. And if I hadn't called at quite a few shops before going to the Party committee, our conversation might well have ended on a happy note. But I was haunted by the image of an empty meat counter in the state shop and a meat stall in the market

where prices are three times higher. So progress is not really so swift. Can things be speeded up?

"The key problem is production cost," says Nikolai Rudyuk. "The average cost of a kilogramme of beef (in the slaughter, not hoof weight) is 4 rubles 36 copecks, and of pork, 4 rubles."

"Does that include the overhead expenses of the meat packing factory and retailing?"

"No. This is what you have at the input of the meat factory. The price is slightly higher after processing and selling."

"That means that by the time beef reaches the consumer it costs almost five rubles a kilo?"

"Yes, almost. But the retail price is 2 rubles. The gap is bridged out of the state budget. So the state actually subsidizes every kilogramme of meat to the tune of three rubles."

"Would it be correct to say that meat is scarce because it is cheap?"

"Yes, but only up to a point. If retail prices are put in line with the actual production cost, the demand will, of course, go down. People will buy less meat. But the aim of the Food Programme is to increase per capita meat consumption to 70 kilogrammes by the year 1990 (the present figure is 63 kg) and then reach the target of 82 kilogrammes, the norm recommended by nutritionists. So the main way of getting rid of meat shortages is not to suppress demand but to boost marketable output."

"Let's then take the bull by the horns, so to speak: is it realistic to expand marketable meat production and at the same time bring down production costs in order to avoid retail price rises?"

"That's a difficult question," Nikolai Rudyuk sighs. Not that the Party secretary is dodging the question. Nor does he think the situation hopeless. Of course, the problems are legion. At present only 72-74 per cent of the need for concentrated fodders is met, the quality of fodders is inferior and protein is the main stumbling block. There is a programme to intensify fodder production in the area. If they continue to expand areas under perennial grasses and lucerne, and get higher yields of high-protein peas, improve the fodder ration by using by-products of sugar-beet production, use carbamide on a wider scale, introduce the new method of raising young animals on elevated grid floors with effective air conditioning, if...

The many "ifs" are added proof of the Party secretary's competence and his commitment to solving the meat problem. But I kept wondering if the same level of commitment to expanding market meat production and bringing down its cost is to be found among the people who work in the field or on the livestock farm. What is their thinking, what are they doing and how are they going about it?

Drawing by Leonid Tishkov

Out of the Party secretary's window I saw a wide paved square, lawns and neatly trimmed fir trees. From the office, everything seems all right, but cattle are not raised here. What is the situation down on the farm?

"You should talk to Dmitry Alexeyev in the village of Minkovtsy," says Nikolai Rudyuk. "That farm has been paying its way for three years. They are building a lot, but they don't come begging for loans from the state. Their profits are almost 40 per cent. Out of the country's 26,559 collective farms only two and a half thousand have equalled or topped this performance."

Down on the farm

I remember well how Dmitry Alexeyev started his career.

In August 1980 the members of the collective farm in the village of Minkovtsy elected him, a 32-year-old agronomist and graduate of the Kamenets-Podolsky Agricultural Institute, to be manager of their farm. By that time he had some experience, having worked as a team leader and deputy director of a neighbouring farm. The son of a farmer, Dmitry has all the skills a modern farmer needs in the field, in a livestock complex, and in a garage or repair shop. But the main qualification for his job is best summed up in the word "head." When he became head of a weak, loss-making farm, Alexeyev felt that first of all he had to give people an incentive to work well, to improve their working and living conditions, give them the maximum of freedom and get the same degree of freedom for the farm.

Each time I come to Minkovtsy I have to update the entries in my notebook. For example, milk yields per cow have been growing from 2,700 litres to 3,832, to 4,200. The weight of the cattle on the hoof is increasing. Borrowing from the government is going down. The number of new buildings is on the rise. There is movement in every important area of the farm's performance. The farm is getting onto its feet and it is no accident that its manager was elected a delegate to the 27th Congress of the CPSU.

I began by asking the main question: "Is there a real chance of cutting meat production costs and increasing the yield of marketable produce?"

"Yes, there is," Alexeyev replied firmly. "Here is a recent example. Last year we introduced a new method of pig breeding. Without going into technicalities, I'll give you the figures.

"In a single year we

"Saved 26 tons of diesel fuel, i.e., more than half our annual consumption;

"Saved 1,080 rubles on wages: we used to have two cooks on the farm, now we have one;

"Cut fodder expenditure per unit of output from 14.8 to 6.4 conventional feed units;

"Increased the yield of marketable meat;

"Brought down the production cost of 100 kilogrammes of pork (on the hoof, and not slaughter weight) from 282 rubles 87 copecks to 189 rubles 92 copecks.

"So it can be done if you have the skill and commitment. If you pay people for their skill and commitment, then the results will not be long in coming.

"Another growth area is the contract scheme. The collective farm has given 50

calves to a family (a young couple). You should see how they work! How thriftily they run the farm! They save every bunch of straw, and the calves keep putting on weight. This is one answer to cutting production costs. Granted, the family have to work hard and much of the work is manual. But then nobody is forcing them, they work of their own free will."

"Aren't they fed up with this work?"

"No. They earn almost twice as much. If things go as well as they are going now we'll give them a hundred calves to raise, and we may start thinking about renting them some land. Let them work and earn more."

"Would other families be willing to sign similar contracts and rent land from the collective farm?"

"A lot of them would. People are eager to work. Another untapped reserve is the development of private allotments. It's always a pleasure for me to come to Anatoly Dolina's household plot. Work is going full blast. He raises four calves a year, sells them to the farm and makes a good living. He is an efficient farmer. He wouldn't settle for any kind of cattle. He takes only Simmental animals. He gets husks and carbamide and has switched to dry feeding. No wonder his production costs are low. I tell my livestock and economics specialists to go and learn from him.

"In fact Dolina runs his farm by modern scientific and technological methods: pedigree cattle, advanced technology, resource-saving and cost-accounting.

"Of course, this is the whole point: when a farmer is given independence, he arrives at progressive methods himself and not because somebody imposes them on him. Such people should be helped, but unfortunately the farm's possibilities are limited."

"?!"

"You have to pay people not only in money but also in kind, especially in grain. The farm meets and even exceeds its grain quotas to the state but it was only this year that our farm – alone among the farms in the region – had some grain left over to distribute among the farmers."

"But didn't the 27th CPSU Congress lay down that after the collective farms has met its obligatory target it can dispose of all the rest for its own needs? You voted for these decisions at the congress yourself."

"Certainly I did. But in the two years since the congress, the farm has not acquired the degree of independence spoken about in Moscow."

"Can I quote you on this?"

"Yes. They still take away all the grain. I understand that crops wilt in some places, are washed away in others, and that it is our duty to help. But you can't go on patching up the same holes again and again. We need our own grain too. The more grain we give our farmers, the more meat we will get in return.

"The regional agro-industrial association still makes the farm raise unprofitable crops. Why do I have to allot 45 hectares to grow tobacco? It's just a waste of land. And I could make much better use of it if I sowed it with fodder beet and so cut the cost of meat. Meanwhile, the managers in the neighbouring region are pleading: cut the beetroot target and let us grow more tobacco (they have a different specialization). But planning is still from above and not from below. As long as the bureaucracy of the regional agro-industrial association and agro-industrial committees continue to swell, the situation will not change: planning will continue to be arbitrary. A bureaucrat must have something to do to earn his keep. Incidentally, the salaries of the largely useless managerial personnel are also included in the production cost of agricultural produce, including meat."

"Would it be true to say that if the collective farms were given economic leeway and peasants were given a free hand to work in the cost-accounting team contract unit, on an allotment rented from the state, or on a private plot, meat production could increase dramatically and its cost be cut; in other words, meat supplies could be increased without raising retail prices?"

"Prices are not my province. But there is every chance of increasing meat output and meat sales. I am absolutely sure of that."

Thinking over the words of the collective farm manager, you can't help thinking how timely and necessary were the decisions of the 19th Party conference, how consonant they are with what rural folk are saying everywhere: "Widescale development of cooperative movement, the introduction of cost–accounting and renting contracts... call objectively for radical changes in the running of the agro-industrial complex. Practice has shown that the agro-industrial bodies in the regions and areas are, in their present form, obsolescent... Rural workers know best what forms of management and service organization they need."

And another quotation: "We should overcome... the alienation of the peasant from the land, make him master of his land, protect him against any commands and drastically change rural living conditions. It is only on this basis that agro-industrial production can be made more effective and a dramatic improvement in the food supply in the country be achieved."

Promises have been made. It is time to deliver the goods.

Lev Voskresensky

The political weekly New Times provides a full and clear picture of highlights in the Soviet Union and the world

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Progress or progression?

Cooperative movement overcoming barriers

A constituent congress of the Moscow Cooperators' Union has been held in Moscow. The Union is the juridical person whose function it is to represent, and to protect the interests of cooperators in national and international organizations.
Below the chairman of the Uspekh (Success) cooperative (Moscow) and Director of the Institute of Economics under the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences explain what and whom are these interests to be protected from.

IVAN YEFREMOV

The nationwide discussion of the draft law "On cooperative movement in the U.S.S.R." has helped take into account the wishes and interests of various population groups. It was, I think, the first time in our history that attempts to fit man into a preconceived scheme were rejected. However, the tax scheme under which the progressive tax can be as high as 90 per cent was not raised for discussion. And yet this article of the law, by regulating individual incomes, had more far-reaching implications for individual and cooperative enterprise than any other.

As a result, the decree has been suspended. This is a great success for perestroika, democracy and glasnost. During the course of the experiment, we have seen the enthusiasm of cooperative workers waning. They have been curtailing production and raising prices. Increasingly, they have tried to buy raw materials on the black market and sell their products on the side. The staffs of cooperatives have begun to enlarge as a result of nepotism. Those cooperatives that tried to be honest and above board proved less competitive. The past quarter has seen the output of the cooperative sector go down from 380 to 320 million rubles.

It became clear that the steep progression in personal income tax was a tax on labour productivity. In practice, if income is limited by a quota it is easier to earn it by jacking up prices and not by increasing output. Given the chronic shortage of quality goods and services, people are prepared to pay high prices because they have no option. As a result, the consumer suffers.

High prices are not to be blamed on cooperatives, whose aim is to make a profit. They are an index of erroneous practices on the part of the executive committees of local Soviets and the government apparatus. Prices can only be brought down by increasing supply and competition, which is the motive force of economic progress.

To make a big profit means to produce new goods the prices and demand for which cannot be accurately foretold. Profits are a matter of luck and involve risk. High tax rates make risk meaningless: even with a fifty-fifty chance of success, possible profits will be much less than possible losses.

Equal opportunities

One should also bear in mind that putting the cooperatives on the same footing as state enterprises solely in the field of taxation is unjustified. On the other hand, subjecting them to the same conditions right across the board would transfer the ills of a wasteful economy to the new forms of economic activity. The state provides its own enterprises with capital, premises, plant and machinery, raw materials, cheap labour, guarantees that goods will be marketed and stable wages. If you wanted to equate the cooperatives with state enterprises you would have to allow them the same pampered conditions. The result could only be stagnation, which is exactly what the economic reform is aimed against.

The emergence of cooperatives and individual enterprise, with personal incomes resulting from earnings rather than salaries, has for the first time created the problem of taxation in this country. The use of a complex progression in tax rates is the result of an uncritical application of the experience of the former New Economic Policy in this country as well as outdated foreign experience, neither of which can vindicate the measure today.

In recent years all the developed countries have been lowering income taxes. For example, in the U.S. there are two rates – 15 per cent (80 per cent of taxpayers), and 28 per cent. A family of four is taxed only if its income is in excess of 12,800 dollars a year. In the F.R.G. a couple with two children with an annual income of 50,000 dollars pays income tax at 33 per cent. Japan introduced a 23 per cent tax on cooperatives in 1988.

In a democratic country where all citizens enjoy political equality (one man – one vote), inequality in income, both absolute and relative, is not conducive to greater social justice, and with a progressive increase in the tax rate the constitutional principle "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his work" is distorted.

The argument that the majority of the people are opposed to large incomes is irrelevant. Most people understand that those who earn more give more to society. Those who earn their incomes dishonestly provoke greater indignation than those who earn a lot. It would be much fairer to create equal opportunities rather than level the results.

Income: national, budgetary and shadow

There are two ways of increasing budgetary earnings: by raising taxes to a certain level or by increasing production. The first way – the command-administrative method – is easier, but the second is more practicable and economically more profitable for the whole of society.

If one is committed to increasing the GNP and the incomes of workers, taxes should be fixed at the minimum level guaranteed to cover state expenditure on members of cooperatives and their families. The optimal tax rate is one that combines the highest earnings for the national budget with the least losses of personal incomes.

As is seen from the income distributio

chart by halving taxes budget earnings will be cut by a quarter, the gross output of the cooperatives will increase by 50 per cent and the legal earnings of cooperative members will be almost doubled. It is clear that by raising the tax rate above a certain level the incomes and numbers of people engaged in cooperatives will be caused to decrease and budget earnings will slow down.

An unjustifiably high progressive tax on the cooperatives with the highest profits tempts their members to understate their incomes or distribute them amongst a larger number of tax payers. To be sure, the personnel released from government ministries and departments as a result of staff cuts could undertake the duty of tax inspecting and "inspecting the inspectors." But in that case the incomes of the cooperatives thus revealed would go not to cater to the public needs but to pay the inspectors and the bills for investigation and litigation. The job of tax inspector would become a prestigious one with bureaucrats and a traumatic experience for the producers and their families. A shadow economy would arise. Rackets would flourish. As a result, legal and illegal deductions from profits would decrease the amount of money that goes into the state budget. A crack-down on the shadow economy would influence its scale rather than increase the level of declared taxes.

Giving the executive committees of the local Soviets the right to grant tax rebates would provide a spawning ground for corruption and differentiation amongst cooperatives may develop into discrimination.

Civil tax initiative

The consequences of any system of taxation can only be assessed when enough real data is available. Taxes will be adjusted, until the optimal level is reached. This would take a lot of time. And meanwhile so many opportunities would be missed, so much money remain unearned, so many ideas untried and so many goods and services unproduced...

The most important area of investment for cooperatives is investment in a valid scientific procedure. We cannot afford to allow economics to share the fate of cybernetics and genetics in this country.

A concerted effort on the part of economic institutions, and the use of international economic experience and foreign knowhow are essential. To ensure that the best solution is reached, deputies to the Supreme Soviet should be given a chance to compare several alternatives. If they fail to agree on the best



Income distribution chart

option, the choice could be made by the legislators in the Union Republics in accordance with their national and cultural traditions. This is the quickest way to find out whose solution is more valid. The experience of the republics could then be used nationwide.

More than a hundred chairmen of cooperatives are proposing for public discussion their own scheme of taxation of cooperatives and people engaged in individual labour activities – Civil Tax Initiative.

In 1987 the gross national product came to 825 billion rubles. Spending on social and cultural needs, science, defence and administration was 164 billion rubles, i.e., 20 per cent of the GNP. As the state does not plan to spend anything on cooperatives, paying the cooperative 20 per cent of incomes would more than cover the budgetary expenditure.

Unlike state enterprises, where wages are paid even to inefficient workers, unstable incomes and the possibility of losses in cooperatives suggest that it would be only fair to raise the non-taxable minimum from 70 rubles a month to 100 rubles, plus 100 rubles per dependent.

Economic equality means that the tax rate is the same for all incomes and for each individual.

This means the following rates of taxes, with the first 200 rubles untaxed:

An income of 300 rubles would have 25 rubles deducted in taxes, or 8 per cent.
400 rubles – 50 rubles – 13 per cent
600 rubles – 100 rubles – 17 per cent
1,000 rubles – 200 rubles – 20 per cent
1,800 rubles – 400 rubles – 22 per cent

There would be extra gains for the budget from imposing voluntary taxes on the minimum taxable income.

Such a progressive tax would ensure budgetary earnings while preserving high personal incomes. It would stimulate labour productivity. It would make it profitable to expand production, which would go a long way towards increasing supply and bringing down prices. It would encourage people to have more children. It would make it meaningless to earn less.

As for the proposal to raise the tax on the cooperative itself, this is in fact a tax on the division of labour, on collectivism,

The school of democracy

Leonid Abalkin,
Academician, Director of the Institute of Economics, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences

The flaws in the existing system of taxing the cooperatives pointed out in the so-called Civil Tax Initiative did not come as a surprise. If such important political decisions are adopted in secret, if the interests of a government department are put above those of society, gross errors are bound to occur.

For instance, what is the thinking behind the 90 per cent tax levied on incomes above 1,500 rubles a month? I don't know of any valid scientific argument in favour of that figure. When the specialists in my institute studied this question they came to the conclusion that a personal income tax should not exceed 25 per cent if it is not to be a brake on the cooperative movement and push enterprising people into the shadow economy.

There are some other suggestions. What does that prove? Only one thing: that the legislators in the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. must be able to choose from several alternatives in solving the taxation problem. Let there be a draft of the Finance Ministry, but let there also be a draft from the Academy of Sciences, from Gosplan (State Planning Committee) and, say, from the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. The drafts should be published in the press for thorough public discussion two or three months before the Supreme Soviet session. Only then should the legislators pronounce in favour of one of the options in its entirety. I stress, in its entirety, because I am against inserting compromise formulas into a ready and coherent project. Otherwise you get a patchy and contradictory solution, rather like the article on state orders in the Law on State Enterprise. On the one hand, it says that state orders are placed by tender, as the economists proposed, and on the other, that they are compulsory.

I don't think, however, that the problem of taxing cooperatives should be put to a referendum. A referendum gives a straight yes or no. To introduce or not to introduce a progressive tax. Yes or no? But one should also consider nuances.

Besides, one should face reality. The

which runs counter to the very concept of socialism, as well as to Article 40 Para 2 of the Law "On cooperative movement in the U.S.S.R." which reads: "The state encourages citizens engaged in individual labour activity to unite in cooperatives." All the more so as it is hard to draw a line between the profit of the cooperative earmarked for development and that part of it to be paid in wages. A tax on the overall income is justified if the contract makes it mandatory on the executive committees of local Soviets to share the profits as well as the losses. Such participation is particularly important when state orders are being met.

In our opinion this would be the most democratic taxation system in the world.

Freedom of choice

In the interests of the consumers and to undermine the monopoly of the producers, the local Soviets could encourage competition between the cooperatives themselves as well as between them and state enterprises, as envisaged by the Law "On cooperative movement in the U.S.S.R."

With the emergence of competition – the lever of economic progress – free cooperative prices will force down prices of industrial goods distorted by indirect taxes, which are essentially retrogressive and therefore unfair.

To increase their profits, the cooperatives would seek to sell farm produce at lower prices than those charged by the consumer unions. This would dramatically increase trade, and stimulate early harvesting and efficient storage from which consumers, the cooperatives and the state budget would stand to gain.

Competition would keep the producers on their mettle and encourage them to intensify labour. But the members of cooperatives would themselves benefit from competition in their capacity as consumers as they would have an opportunity to choose.

Given the undeveloped market and distorted prices, it is necessary to auction off loss-making enterprises and the premises of various offices, raw materials, equipment, etc. Auctions are an economic antidote to superprofits and an accurate index of current prices.

Auctions would deprive bureaucrats of their prerogatives in distributing premises, which is currently the main obstacle to creating cooperatives. Auctions in which the owners take part would help determine the real cost of the premises, which would make for more effective use of these premises, and profits derived from favourable location would pass into the state budget.

It is economically sound to allow cooperatives to look for goods or services that would increase the earnings of their members. Such an opportunity, like a prize in sport, would provide an incentive without extra material outlays, encourage an imaginative and enterprising approach on the part of the producers, and sustain optimism in the event of setbacks and hope of future success.

High incomes in individual and cooperative activity, freedom to choose between fixed wages at a state enterprise and earnings through personal individual enterprise would enhance the social value and prestige of competence and skill of engineers, enthusiasts and innovators, people whose work is at present undervalued. Choice is above all the possibility to realize one's potential.

It is becoming increasingly difficult to fix fair wages and salaries operating from offices, even if they are equipped with computers. Work performance increasingly depends not on the time spent in the office but on ideas which are born in seconds but require years of study, intelligence, talent and foresight. The value of these commodities cannot be assessed by bureaucrats, but can only be established by the market and free competition.

The monopoly will face competition. Competition is beginning. The people will be the winners. Unless, of course, the cooperative movement is bound hand and foot. ■

evel of public awareness being what t is, I am afraid that if the question of cooperatives were put to a national vote, the majority would vote for the harshest taxation scheme, which would kill the cooperatives. Many people, and not only administrators, would like to see incomes levelled. The argument as to the size of the tax on personal incomes is in essence an argument about levelling the results of labour. Does such levelling accord with the principle "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his work"? And who has the right to determine what income is normal and what income is too high? What are the criteria? To my mind, to ask how much a person should be allowed to earn is like asking the question: "How many penalty kicks is the referee in a football match allowed to award to the home side?" It is possible that a worker can legitimately earn an income two, three, or five times higher than the average.

It would be much fairer if, instead of trying to level the results, the state tried to equalize the starting conditions of economic activity. Let me explain. If an enterprise, a cooperative or individual worker gets better land, he must pay more for it. If the state has provided a factory with the latest equipment it should be charged more than for machine tools that are fifty years old. Otherwise, you get privileges and no real competition. Equalizing the initial conditions would rule out levelling at the finish. And the gap in incomes would not be so great.

At any rate, it would be fairer. If the opportunities are equal at the start, the rest depends on you, your initiative, industry, thrift and enterprise.

In the heat of the debates on the tax we have forgotten that the question of cooperatives is not about incomes, nor only about how we produce goods and services. The cooperative movement has an indispensable social character. It gives a person a sense of independence, freedom from the bureaucratic machine, and satisfies the fundamental instinct for self-expression in work and initiative.

We have few democratic traditions. People are more eager to learn democracy than ever before. I consider cooperatives to be a school where people acquire the habits of self-government, self-organization and self-discipline. Independence, the sense of being one's own master, is a powerful motivating factor that helps resolve the problems of production as well as of society. If, as a result of cooperative movement, a person stops feeling like a cog in the bureaucratic machine, this will bring about a change in social consciousness. If people see the cooperatives as a weapon against a bureaucratic attitude to life, this will win a lot of supporters for the cooperative movement and open up heady prospects for it.

We journalists and economists must do more to reveal this perspective. The cooperatives that often make the headlines are the few that try to get super-profits at all costs. But little is written about those who sell their wares at government prices, offer better and cheaper services and contribute to our social funds. This helps perpetuate the dogmatic stereotype which is still impeding our progress.

■

ART

Dictation or freedom to express oneself?

Socialist realism has now come in for the most heated discussion ever in Soviet artistic circles. This was entirely predictable. Proclaimed at the First Congress of the U.S.S.R. Writers' Union, conceived and "suggested" by Stalin in the course of preparations for the congress, this method, as the main instrument of official policy in art, has for decades been used as a universal criterion in our culture. Set above criticism by the "high priests" of art, it has long been used as a weapon against whatever failed to fit into its rigid limits.

At a session of the Board of the Artists' Union two years ago, I dared question the paragraph of its Statute proclaiming socialist realism "the highest stage in the development of world art," and suggest that various methods and trends in art be accepted and amendments made to the Statute, which dates from 1957.

So far, we haven't advanced an inch in this direction. This is hardly to be wondered at, considering that socialist realism, as interpreted, is upheld chiefly by members of the Academy of Arts, who owe to it their renown, privileges, honorary titles and, last but not least, the right and opportunity to dictate to the artistic world.

The artists' congress failed to live up to our expectations, either. It did not get round to artistic problems or adopt a new Statute.

Now a draft new Statute of the Union has been submitted to artists for discussion. It is written in the old tradition and greatly resembles army regulations. Even worse, it doggedly adheres to the traditional interpretation of socialist realism, and its place and role in artistic life. Consequently, whatever transcends its confines will be regarded as evil. It would of course be quite improper to ban anyone from professing the principles of socialist realism in his work; but neither is it permissible to divide artists into "clean" and "unclean" depending on what method or trend they prefer.

I am sure that in order to put an end to this vicious practice a real, rather than a sham, perestroika will have to be carried out in the Artists' Union proper. This could be done by the National Artists' Conference. True, originally scheduled for September, it was first postponed till November, and then till sometime in 1989.

It is my conviction that in the context of perestroika this matter cannot be delayed any longer.

Igor Obrosov,
Secretary of the Board,
U.S.S.R. Artists' Union,
People's Artist
of the Russian Federation

I am the state

Andrei Grachev

Before lecturing your neighbour, put your own house in order. And don't disregard the experience of others. The standards of human relationships can be also applied to humanitarian cooperation.

Only recently the term human rights as such did not appear in our press or political treatises without being placed between inverted commas or being preceded by the attribute "so-called." Hearing the words pronounced in debates with their foreign counterparts, our representatives would "recoil," preparing to give a resolute rebuff to "attacks on socialism" and attempts "to interfere in the internal affairs" of the socialist countries.

This defensive reaction reflected the misinterpretation of socialism widespread in the years of stagnation and in large measure inherited from the previous decades coloured by the personality cult. Karl Marx associated these views with the idea of crude communism everywhere repudiating the human personality and identifying it with "the preconceived minimum." The minimum of well-being, the minimum of social justice, the minimum of democracy.

Antiworlds?

Now, along with other truths of Marxism-Leninism, we are discovering for ourselves the correct attitude to the human rights problem.

Having defined the objective as building a self-governing democratic society, we are justified in striving to develop a community where each member is entitled to say, after Louis XIV: "L'Etat, c'est moi" (I am the state).

Accordingly, we urgently need to produce a mechanism that will ensure the realization of a socialist pluralism of opinions, guarantee the interests and protect the rights of each individual, consider the stands, opinions and views of all members of society and coordinate them with the public interest.

Unfortunately, due to our accumulated negative experience, we must now, to a great extent, in a sense rediscover the maxim expressed by V.I. Lenin: "Whoever wants to reach socialism by any other path than that of political democracy, will inevitably arrive at conclusions that are absurd and reactionary, both in the economic and the political sense." It goes without saying that the democratization of society is inconceivable without the guarantee and protection of human rights.

The new interest in the problem of human rights, the thorough and profound analysis of it with regard to all aspects of present norms in our society is in no sense to be understood as a concession to pressure from the West. The need for development and the profound democratic restructuring of our society compels us to raise and resolve human rights issues. In doing so, we do not intend to copy and blindly follow Western standards. Yet, at the same time, it would be wrong to ignore the democratic experience accumulated by bourgeois society. Socialism has no ambition to build an anti-world or anti-universe that in its every feature confronts the capitalist society from which it emerged and with which it severed itself as a result of the socialist revolution. The socialist system is a step forward that promotes everything genuinely humane and common to all mankind, everything amassed by previous forms of social organization.

Socialism, with its genuine democratic and humanitarian vision regained, suggests its release from the gross distortions and deformations that were forced on it during Stalin's rule. What is at issue is not just the setting up of an impregnable barrier to safeguard us from the threat of any recurrence of the monstrous lawless practices and trampling on human rights perpetrated at that time but also the need to break down the administrative and command system we inherited from it. This system exists not only in the form of the bureaucratic superstructure but also lives on deep in the collective consciousness in the shape of garbled ideas about the relationship between the individual and the state in a socialist society.

A concept has evolved in the minds of many people that civil and socio-economic rights are not a sovereign and inelienable attribute of each individual but something of a "gift" from the state and party leaders. The reverse of this mentality is social apathy, indifference and that form of parasitism where each believes that the government and state are there to take care of him.

This idea of how the machinery of socialist democracy works undermines the civic initiative of the masses and the social activity of each member of society and severs the interaction between rights and obligations which can be the only basis on which to ensure the fulfilment of the individual.

We also need to restore another integral whole that has been brutally torn apart — the whole consisting of socio-economic, civil and political rights of the individual. The artificial fragmentation of the human rights complex brought about a situation where the individual in a socialist society, "in return" for guaranteed social security, was alienated from the political process and participation in the mechanism of government.

Civil and political rights must assume a real and concrete, "fulfilled" character as has happened in the sphere of socio-economic rights. This must be underpinned by legal guarantees through the elaboration of the relevant laws furthering and concretizing some clauses and principles of the Soviet Constitution. This process has already begun and will be expedited according to the special resolution on legal reform adopted by the 19th Party conference.

Law is not enough

However, the elaboration of the most impeccable laws and the more precise definition or even review of some constitutional provisions cannot ensure the complete solution of the problem that has been posed. In 1936 the country received a fairly democratic constitution which was, however, powerless to stand in the way of the orgy of repressions. It is necessary to establish a mechanism that will guarantee the application of the law and abidance by it as a fundamental rule governing the whole of public life. This can be achieved through the legal education of the population, "learning democracy," comprehensive compulsory instruction that must embrace both the administrative personnel of different Soviet institutions, party and public organizations (who make vital decisions related to living conditions), and the broadest strata of the ordinary people. We still do not know how to use the laws already in existence and are unable to claim protection of our rights, being accustomed only to grumbling about negligent managers or overzealous petty tyrants.

Belief must be restored in the effectiveness of democracy, the conviction that the individual's actions, opinions, and choice can influence both the further development of perestroika and concrete living and working conditions for each and all. The inability to resolve the problem of the democratic and civic education of the masses, and win back the citizen to active membership of socialist society will once again bog us down in that mire of social apathy and historical fatalism which is the breeding ground for personality cults.

A socialist state governed by law is inconceivable without the assertion of the reciprocal responsibility of the state and its citizens for the observance of the law, the maintenance of public order, and guarantees of the whole spectrum of the citizen's political and civil freedoms and socio-economic rights.

Unnecessary "victories"

Particular interest is also attached to the human rights issue in the broader sense of humanitarian cooperation, in the sphere of international relations. Such discussions arise in the course of diplomatic negotiations and other government and public contacts between East and West.

In recent years these spheres have been burdened with reciprocal propaganda considerations. The temptation was too strong on both sides to exploit human rights as tool to gain an albeit short-lived but dazzling propaganda victory over the opponent.

There are objective factors, however, that stand in the way of dialogue and mutual understanding. Human rights issues are tied up with ideological confrontation, with often irreconcilable philosophical and political differences, and the desire to prove the superiority and advantages of one's own social system and one's own choice to the detriment of that of the opponent. Broadly speaking, specific human rights policies come under the jurisdiction of respective states and governments and these polemics, therefore, can very often be interpreted or presented as an attempt to interfere in each other's internal affairs.

There are also a great many artificial obstacles. For too long diplomats, followed by the press as well as the representatives of public organizations, have interpreted discussions raised in the West solely as an attempt at the ideological erosion of our social system or a topic of vicious propaganda campaigns. It should be admitted, however, that the West gave ample ground for such suspicions.

At the same time, the restrictive factor in our foreign policy was unquestionably our underestimation of the organic connection that nowadays exists between security and humanitarian cooperation. Having signed over 13 years ago, together with other European countries, the U.S. and Canada, the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, we treated it largely as a document consolidating the territorial-political realities of postwar Europe, ignoring the "third basket" and questions relating to humanitarian cooperation. And this was to a great extent because the West, in its turn, saw the document as the diametrical opposite, as it were, of our interpretation, regarding the Final Act as a document on human rights.

Charity begins at home

In a sense humanitarian cooperation is as much a part of the process of political détente as control systems are part and parcel of any disarmament accord. In both instances, what is at issue is strengthening the mutual understanding without which it is impossible to achieve understanding on issues of mutual security.

In an open society the state's foreign policy and its strategic intentions are predictable. Silent practices, however, and unnecessary secrecy give rise to suspicion on the part of partners and opponents alike, playing into the hands of forces opposed to the relaxation of tension and mutual understanding in their efforts to justify the buildup of tension and the arms race.

The paradox now is that whereas the Soviet Union is revising its backward approach to the issue of humanitarian contacts, the West, particularly the United States, is coming out with bitter ideologically-coloured appeals to free "the nations enslaved by communism," and whip up pressure on countries that have opted for socialism with a view to bringing them back to the realm of freedom.

Is cooperation between East and West possible in the sphere of human rights? Or is it doomed to remain a constant battleground for propaganda warfare, especially at a time when wars with the use of other weapons are, fortunately, becoming less and less likely? I should like to hope that cooperation in the humanitarian field is a reality. To achieve this, several simple conditions must be observed. We shall try to formulate them.

First and foremost is the commitment to ensure human rights and their genuine implementation in one's own country. "Charity begins at home," as the familiar saying has it. The same goes for the sincerity of any foreign policy, or highly moral appeals to the other side, which must be underpinned by scrupulous and real work in putting one's own house in order.

Both sides should abandon attempts to reshape the other after its own likeness against the former's will. They should also give up the temptation to see in the opposite side a hangover from a past obsolescent world which is about to disappear. The experience of seventy years of coexistence shows that they will still be on this planet for a long time and this is why they should work out civilized rules for competition and the juxtaposition of their political and social experience.

Both East and West have accumulated a great deal of experience in resolving the vital problems their societies encounter. Neither can claim to be perfect, and neither possesses the ultimate truth, or indeed, has a monopoly on it. Naturally, the foreseeable future does not and simply cannot hold out hope of doing away with the profound socio-political differences in approach and social practice that characterize the situation of how human rights are in reality ensured in the East and the West. This is, clearly, why the exchange of criticism on these aspects of social life should not be halted.

At the same time, humanitarian cooperation, different ways of resolving social issues, ensuring the political and civil rights of man, and creating the most favourable conditions for the realization of his individual abilities and creative potential could become an area for cooperation between states and people living in countries with different social systems the world over. ■

PUBLIC OPINION

We can use the experience of others

A human rights poll in Kaliningrad



International peace barometer

Immediately after the Moscow summit in June of this year, the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences' Institute of Sociological Research conducted an opinion poll in Kaliningrad as part of the "International Peace Barometer" project. 285 people were polled. One in three mentioned humanitarian problems, the human rights issue, as the priority subject for top-level talks between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.

The poll showed that an inhabitant of an average Soviet town is sceptical of the information about the U.S. provided by TV, radio and the papers in this country. Most respondents pointed out that "information on human rights in the U.S. is for the most part one-sided and negative." Only 22 per cent believe that the information provided by the Soviet mass media gives a sufficiently full and objective picture.

The Soviet people favour a constructive exchange of information on human rights between the two countries. As many as 91 per cent take a positive view of TV and radio space links, 86 per cent support the idea of an exchange of TV and radio programmes, 80 per cent want articles by foreign journalists, scientists and politicians published in newspapers and magazines, 78 per cent approve of exchanges of information on human rights such as inviting scientists and public figures to lecture.

It can be concluded from the results of the poll that Soviet citizens are critical of the human rights situation in both the United States and their own country; 25 per cent gave the U.S. a bad mark in this field, and almost as many – 21 per cent – a similar mark to the U.S.S.R.; 5 per cent thought the American situation "fairly good," and 24 per cent gave a similar assessment to the U.S.S.R. The majority (83 per cent) felt that the human rights situation in the U.S.S.R. was changing for the better with perestroika.

As many as 92 per cent of those polled favoured cooperation and the exchange of experience between the two countries in the field of human rights; 45 per cent believed American experience in this field could be used in our country (only 12 per cent were against the idea); 57 per cent believed America could benefit from Soviet experience. What, in their opinion, could the Americans benefit from? First of all, our experience in guaranteeing the right to a job (60 per cent of those polled), and free medical services (25 per cent). In addition, they mentioned the solution of the nationalities question (about 20 per cent), the right to a home (about 20 per cent), education (17 per cent), and material security in old age (about 10 per cent).

As for what we could borrow from the United States, respondents singled out first and foremost political freedoms; the right to leave and return to the country, freedom of speech and association, freedom to demonstrate, an election system offering a genuine choice. The right to leave and return to the country freely was mentioned by 43 per cent of respondents to the question: "In which fields could we copy the Americans?" Almost one in three named this as one of the most important rights.

Mikhail Savin and Alexander Smagin,
candidates of sciences (philosophy)



Why Winston Churchill said No

Lev Bezymensky

The Joint Anglo-American Chiefs of Staff had been discussing the plans presented by the Polish command since the spring of 1943. Subsequently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed in-depth plans for a Polish uprising in September 1943, immediately after endorsing the Overlord and Rankin plans. They now considered General Sosnkowski's proposal to employ his troops as a vast airborne landing force. The political meaning behind the general's suggestion was clear: the AK (Polish Secret Army) leadership and the government-in-exile in London regarded a general uprising in Poland not so much as a means of assisting the Western Allies, as a way of forestalling the Red Army and entrenching their own power in Poland.

However, analyzing Col. L. Mitkiewicz's proposals, they found themselves faced with what might be termed as a "squaring of the circle." This, of course, was tempting, but, on the other hand, plain horse sense questioned how such a thing could be planned not with, but against the Red Army. In other words, how could an idea of such an anti-Soviet nature be linked with the Allies' overall strategy, and their objective of routing the Nazis as quickly as possible? No wonder, indeed, that having received the above-mentioned memorandum on employing the AK in "all-European allied planning," the Combined Intelligence Committee raised the matter thus:

"Would the Polish secret army, if fully equipped, be directed against Russia or Germany, or both?"

Continued. For the beginning see No. 33

Washington's response

In 1943 the AK put two basic demands to the Western Allies. These were, firstly, to equip the AK in order to enable it to stage a successful armed uprising in Poland and, secondly, that the uprising be timed by the AK command. General Sosnkowski put this as follows:

In view of the fact that very large German forces are stationed in Poland at the present moment and that their number increases at the Eastern Front approaches to the Polish frontiers, a general rising would be an act of sacrifice of the Polish nation. It is obvious that it could not be twice replaced. Because of these two important factors, to give the order for a general rising must be within the exclusive competence of the Polish nation.

The Committee analyzed these demands and issued a decision that clearly did not suit the emigré leadership. Observing that arms and ammunition for sabotage and intelligence-gathering in Poland were already being delivered in line with the existing agreement, the Committee was unable to agree to amplify these deliveries. It further noted that the Western Allies were not in a position to "guarantee" success. This last, extremely veiled formulation contained the essence of the matter – the Committee's realization that Poland lay outside the zone of joint strategic Anglo-American responsibility. Hence, without coordinating such planning with the Soviet Union, it would be utterly abortive. Such was the answer given on September 23, 1943.

Assessments of this reply cannot deny that it was logical and well-founded. Though, of course, an uprising in Poland could have been useful in combined operations when the time came to liberate that long-suffering country, an operation of this order would be practical only if undertaken in conjunction with the Red Army, as both the logic and spirit of the anti-Hitler Alliance dictated. The military realized that very well, not to speak of their reluctance to allocate resources that were being massed for the impending invasion of Northern France.

So did this mean a refusal? The point is that having set out all the "cons" the Anglo-American Joint Chiefs of Staff told the AK to take the decision itself. They put it thus:

"The Chiefs of Staff were too far from the scene to take responsibility for calling upon the Poles to institute a complete mobilization and a general rising throughout Poland..."

How is this to be understood? As a desire to wash hands of the entire affair or as camouflaged acquiescence to plans for an uprising? There is much evidence in favour of the latter. Indeed, after the September "refusal" neither Sosnkowski, nor Bor stopped debating action plans with the Allied Military Command.

When I discussed this point with London University professor Jan M. Ciechanowski, a prominent British historian who has analyzed the Polish uprising, he offered the following interpretation:

"Evidently in London they thought that if the uprising was successful it would be a good thing, while if it didn't come off, they could stand on the sidelines and say that they had given the appropriate warning."

The more the merrier

1944, the year in which preparations were made for Overlord and Rankin, began. The Polish government-in-exile and its "delegates" in Warsaw were energetically drafting the political and military aspects of the Tempest plan. Mikolajczyk met Churchill at least seven times in January, February and April. Their discussions were not confined to the uprising or Warsaw. Thus the minutes of the February 16, 1944, meeting note that when Churchill reproached Mikolajczyk with inaction, he said that "he was quite ready to return to Warsaw even before the Russians arrived." That is what one gleans from the archives of the then Polish Foreign Minister Romer now in Ottawa.

Contacts between officers were still brisker. A Foreign Office paper dated February 8, 1944, notes that after the British Chiefs of Staff had discussed the issue in January-February 1944, the Special Operations Executive (SOE) was instructed to activate its Polish "agents" and link this up with

"a rising of the AK, which was to take place directly after the invasion of Europe."

Mr Allen of the Central European Department, who produced this document, recalled that in 1943 the Chiefs of Staff abandoned the idea, as they believed all practical assistance for the uprising to be out of question. Then, however, Allen wrote, this view was revised and the SOE was instructed to facilitate the Polish action. **The appropriate decision was taken by the military cabinet in February 1944.**

RECORD OF A MEETING HELD AT No.10 DOWNING STREET

ON WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 16th, 1944, at 5.30 p.m.

Present:

The Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill, C.H., M.P., Prime Minister in the Chair

M.Mikolajczyk, Polish Prime Minister — The Right Hon. Anthony Eden, M.C., M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

M.Romer, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs — Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Count Raczyński, Polish Ambassador to Great Britain — Sir Owen O'Malley, British Ambassador to the Polish Government

Secretariat: Mr.P.K.Roberts

SECRET

The PRIME MINISTER said that we had shown the Poles the text of what we thought it would be best to say to Marshal Stalin. We had wanted the Poles to agree to this. It appeared, however that they could not go so far as this. Had the Poles brought their own draft ?

M.MIKOLAJCZYK said the Prime Minister was probably aware that he had certain difficulties within his Cabinet. The Polish Government had not produced an alternative draft message but they had produced a short paper defining their attitude on certain points (this paper ist attached as Annex I).

The PRIME MINISTER after reading the paper referred to the reference to keeping Wilna on the Polish side of the demarcation line. He remembered that after the last war we had been angry with the Poles for jumping this claim and seizing Wilna by military force.

Mr.MIKOLAJCZYK, after remarking that Poland thought she

An excerpt from the Mikolajczyk-Churchill talks transcript

Further military-political developments did not remove the question of an uprising in Poland from the allied staffs' agenda. Inquiries and proposals were again addressed to them, including some to General Dwight Eisenhower, who was in command of the forthcoming Operation Overlord. As a result, the 1943 situation was repeated: it was noted that without coordination with the Red Army an uprising would be out of the question and that it would also be impossible in practice to augment the scale of Anglo-American aid.

One more refusal? However, with extraordinary stubbornness the Chiefs of Staff repeated:

"that responsibility for calling a general rising in Poland must be left to Polish authorities, and that the timing could best be decided by the Polish commander on the spot."

SO what construction is to be put on it?

Near St. Cross Cathedral in Warsaw during the uprising

A visit to Washington

Archive documents provide evidence that after informing the U.K., the Polish government-in-exile kept the U.S. up-to-date with its plans, even at the time when Mikolajczyk visited Washington from June 4 to 15, 1944.

General Stanislaw Tatar (Tabor), the operations chief of the Polish command, arrived in Washington separately in mutri. He had brought with him a detailed memorandum on AK activity, thus carrying forward what had been agreed upon with Col. L. Mitkiewicz back in 1943. The memorandum was discussed with General Bissell, chief of military intelligence, who was particularly interested in the AK's relationships with the Red Army and

Soviet partisans. Subsequently, Tatar d a 45-minute talk with John McCloy, sistant U.S. Secretary of War, and neral Joseph T. McNarney. On June the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff under miral Leahy had a special meeting at ich British representatives were also sent.

The Polish representative requested at the number of flights for the Polish air ce be increased to between 150 and 0 and that supply depots be set up in tain. Finally, he spoke of

"the execution of a general uprising coordinated and timed with the allied operations to be decided upon."

These short notes evidently do not ver the more detailed conversations. hen Mikolajczyk returned to London, told Churchill on June 22 that

"he had done his best to interest Mr Roosevelt in the projects for extensive military action by the underground movement in cooperation with the Russian Army."

We must not be deluded by what kolajczyk said about "cooperation with Russian Army." He knew who he was aling with and that Roosevelt would sympathize with him unless he asred him of his loyalty to the Soviet nion. Following his Premier, Tatar called his British colleagues, and on June 27 d Lord Selborne that in the U.S. not ly political matters but also an 80 mill-n dollars loan for the AK had been dissed. More specifically, he had asked e Americans for

"1,300 flights to Poland to be carried en masse... in order to make possible an uprising of the Secret Army."

The noble Lord cautiously noted:

"In reply I said that any question of the uprising of the PSA and the allocation of important air forces for its support must be dealt with on the military plane. The proper method was to the Chiefs of Staff Secretariat through the SOE."

Tatar's idea did not arouse any enusiasm on the part of the British Chiefs Staff. They said they

"did not think it advisable directly to encourage the Poles to increase their operations in a sense favourable to the Russians.

Consequently no special promises ere made. However, again:

"We should not deceive the Poles in this way and should leave any such responsibility directly to them, at all events, pending any general uprising."

London knew very well that those masrminding the uprising did not plan conicts with the Red Army. Thus, Bor mainined that the uprising would trigger off

Barricades in Warsaw

"a political campaign against Russia, which we must wage and win. In this campaign we can count on Anglo-Saxon help only when we display our determination to win it and skilfully to throw onto the scales all our resources."

For which reason, he added (when the uprising was already in progress):

No contact with the Red Army could so far be established and we did not anticipate any observable effect from Soviet operations on our fight.

In turn, Mikolajczyk's representative J.S. Jankowski, who was in Warsaw, said in July that it was

"out of the question to start the insurrection on account of the fighting in the East."

Such was the real attitude of those masterminding the uprising to the Soviet Army of liberation.

Who were they helping?

The "two hearts" of Britain's military leaders increasingly diverged with the passage of time. The ground slipped from under the Rankin plan, its preconditions proving pure fiction. Practice itself favoured Overlord and the rejection of the provocative advances made by Polish bourgeois politicians to act as a vast airborne landing force in military operations in Europe. However, the political considerations that linked Churchill so closely with his Polish clients now came into play. Suppose it comes off? Such were the cynical calculations that determined London's subsequent attitude. In practice this implied that the British, as far as actions in Poland were concerned, preferred to back the AK militants and ignored the sensible judgements voiced by a number of officers in the AK itself. As for the Polish left, London simply did not want to know.

As time went by, the SOE dutifully carried out the Cabinet's February instructions, and the AK leaders reciprocated. On July 11 the Foreign Office was notified that the SOE was working to foment AK subversion in Poland. A detailed plan was appended for a series of subversive acts that were to paralyze rail traffic throughout Poland, known as the Barrier plan, along with a timetable stating that the AK was already prepared to launch the first two series of actions and had planned the third and fourth series for July 25, and the 5th and 6th series for August 10. The author added:

"This action is not a general rising. It can, however, be ordered by Mr Mikolajczyk."

London was well aware that since July 21, the AK leaders and Mikolajczyk's Warsaw delegate Jankowski had been frantically discussing the situation. One catalyst was the attempted assassination of Hitler on July 20, on which hopes of the Reich's collapse had been pinned. However, the paramount concern was the Soviet Army's rapid advance in liberating the country. Bor, Jankowski and the men in London were especially taken aback by the arrival in Poland of troops of the Polish People's Army and the establishment in Lublin of the Polish Committee of National Liberation. The AK leadership

feared that, if inactive, it would lose popular support. They saw as their only alternative not the establishment of contacts with the Red Army, but a forestalling operation. Moreover, they decided to include in their plans an uprising in **Warsaw itself,** which had not been envisaged earlier, and subsequently confined the entire rising to **Warsaw alone.** Consequently the Bor-Jankowski decision, far from according with the earlier concept of the Tempest plan, clashed with it. Mikolajczyk knew all about it, as did General Gubbins' office. That was when the scene was set for the penultimate part of the overture to the impending tragedy.

The penultimate act

When the Chiefs of Staff were notified in London of the impending uprising in Warsaw and of Polish requests for help, the British issued a refusal as early as July 26. The relevant document indicated that when Sosnkowski's representatives had made

> **"a request for certain specified forms of assistance in connection with the rising, they were informed that it was operationally impractical for HMG to meet any of these requests."**

On July 27 Edward Raczynski met Anthony Eden and, having confirmed that everything was ready for the uprising, said that the British command should take several steps to carry it out. On July 28, Orme Sargent said that Polish requests, including one to send a Polish paratroop brigade, had been turned down. However, the Polish politicians in London did not relay this refusal to Bor clearly desirous of seeing the uprising commence, as Mikolajczyk had gone to Moscow for talks and needed a "trump card."

Next the two generals, Kopanski and Tatar, called on the British General Staff to once again demand help for the impending operation. In response, the Chiefs of Staff Committee authorized a special commission composed of G. Grantham, C.S. Sugden and W.L. Dawson to consider the Tatar-Kopanski requests. On July 31 the commission, having drafted an 11-point memorandum, advised:

> **"a) On strategic grounds, the proposals cannot be justified.**
>
> **b) There are very serious practical difficulties in the way of these proposals.**
>
> **c) It would be politically and militarily unacceptable to undertake any such measures without the approval and co-operation of the Russians."**

One is bound to note that in drafting their conclusions, the military experts acted in the spirit of the anti-nazi Alliance in warning against separate action. On August 2, General Ismay forwarded post-factum the following official reply to War Minister General Kukiel:

> **"Sympathizing as they do with your desire to give the fullest possible support to the Polish Home Army in its fight for the liberation of your country, they greatly regret to have to say that they consider your proposals impracticable at the present time."**

The same opinion is voiced in memorandum No. 654/1 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who categorically declared in connection with the Polish requests:

> **"On military grounds they are unable to undertake any of the operations proposed."**

Translated into ordinary language, this means that the Churchill government, aware of the hopelessness of the uprising, had washed its hands of the affair.

That was what happened. Although in starting the uprising Bor counted on Anglo-American, not Soviet, assistance, as was subsequently represented, such assistance was hopelessly inadequate. The first night flight to Warsaw from Italy took place on August 4 and of the 14 aircraft involved four were lost. Only a third of the cargoes dropped reached those they were intended for. Nine more flights took place on August 8 through 18, after which the Anglo-American command concluded that the operations should be stopped.

The AK leadership responded indignantly to these decisions. On August 6 Bor telegraphed General Tatar in London:

> **"I state solemnly that Warsaw in its fighting does not receive assistance from the Allies in the same way as Poland did not receive it in 1939. Our alliance with Great Britain has resulted only in bringing her our assistance in 1940 by repelling the German attack against the British Isles."**

Further, Bor directly hinted that at this moment in 1944 British politicians were sacrificing the Poles to their own ends. Mikolajczyk received a message from Warsaw in which Jankowski expressed his failure to understand the passiveness of the great ally.

As for the U.S. attitude, it did not evolve as the uprising's planners had anticipated. When in early August the question of employing General Eaker's 15th Air Force unit was raised, the reply that came on August 15 was:

> **"General Eaker states that it is definitely and completely agreed to be an impracticable operation because the distance of 770 miles precludes fighter cover in the target area and necessitates the use of bomb bay tanks which are in short supply. Furthermore all available reserves have been committed for the support of DRAGOON (to support troops in France)... In view of the unfeasibility of day operations to Warsaw, and the commitment of all available XVth Air Force resources to DRAGOON, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion..."**

What do you think? These came following Machiavellian reply:

> **"...the acceptance of responsibility for helping Poles in Warsaw by Marshal Stalin plus the maximum night effort of the special operations units represent the best solution to the situation under the existing circumstances."**

Such was the line of reasoning – to tell the Soviet Union nothing before the rising, but then to make it responsible both for assisting it and for its failure. Regrettably, our allies resorted to exactly this method, which deserves special analysis.

"Would be very costly"

As we see, the British Military Command believed the uprising would be futile. More than that, even General Bor, who gave orders for the uprising to begin, thought so. He said:

Nazi troops in Warsaw

"In view of the present state of German forces in Poland and their anti-insurrectionary preparations,... the rising has no prospect of success."

His chief, General Sosnkowski added:

"Under the existing circumstances I am absolutely opposed to a general insurrection... A mistake in this sphere would be very costly."

Conferring with Mikolajczyk on July 3, he noted:

"An insurrection without a previous fair understanding with the U.S.S.R. and honest and real cooperation with the Red Army would be politically unjustified and militarily nothing more than an act of despair."

And that was what in fact happened. At the eleventh hour the general took himself to Italy. Years later Bor said that had Sosnkowski ordered him not to begin he would have obeyed. "He received no such order," the British historian Jan Ciechanowski succinctly observes. We might add that neither did the uprising's masterminds receive any such order or even such a recommendation from the British Command.

However, there is also another aspect to the manner in which the British – and American – military behaved. Aware in advance that the Polish government-in-exile and the AK command were reluctant to coordinate plans with the Red Army, they confined themselves to wishful thinking on this score. Such is the account that may be rendered to both London and Washington on behalf of the victims of Warsaw: **neither Britain, nor the U.S. notified the Soviet Union of the planned uprising.**

There were plenty of opportunities to do so in February, April and even July when London already knew that the uprising would take place! On July 28 Soviet Ambassador F. Gusev called on Sir Alexander Cadogan, Anthony Eden's Permanent Undersecretary, who said nothing, though he knew about it. Next day he spoke on the telephone with Gusev, but again said nothing.

From London to Moscow

If we proceed from London to Moscow, and from Kew to the Soviet Foreign Policy Archives, we shall see what the repercussions of the Warsaw uprising were. The British Military Mission in Moscow received a telegram noting that the uprising had begun at 01:10 hrs on August 2. Though the contents may have been relayed to the Soviet side on the same day, the official notification dispatched to the U.S.S.R. People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs is dated August 3.

Today no Western historian, even one unfavourably disposed towards us, will deny that the Soviet government and the military command were not notified of either the plan or the time of the uprising. The situation on the fighting fronts at the time was difficult, as outside Warsaw, Soviet troops, having initiated the liberation of Poland and covered from 500 to 600 kilometres since the start of the summer offensive, had run into resistance from fresh German forces. The situation was further exacerbated by the fact that the Soviet strategy had not planned a frontal assault on Warsaw.

At the time Premier Mikolajczyk was in Moscow. There is much evidence to show that the uprising was specially timed to coincide with his visit. One curious piece of evidence that comes from British sources is the confidential dispatch from London to Ambassador Sir Archibald Clark Kerr in Moscow on August 16. In it he was told how to explain the uprising to the Soviet government. It was a six-point dispatch and the British Ambassador notified Molotov of all points except the fifth point, which he prudently excluded, to wit the explanation that the decision to start the uprising had been influenced by the wish to help Mr Mikolajczyk's talks in Moscow.

As for Mikolajczyk, he conducted himself as follows: on the evening of July 31 he called on People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs Molotov and said very vaguely – for which I quote the Soviet record – that:

"The Polish government is considering a plan for a general uprising in Warsaw and would like to ask the Soviet government to bomb aerodromes around Warsaw."

Note: "is considering" and "would like." But the Polish government did nothing even on the very eve of events!

At the start of this article I observed that today much will be seen in a different light. But not **everything.** In short, what happened, happened. In the context of the newly declassified British documents, the Soviet government's judgement of 1944 appears quite fair and just.

Archives always present the evidence. In the same way as it is fascinating to read the commentaries of Churchill and Eden on Foreign Office papers, so it is equally exciting to peruse the notes of Stalin and Molotov on the documents preserved in Moscow. When Churchill, in a message to Moscow, accused the Soviet Union of reluctance to help the uprising, the reply was discussed at the highest level. The Soviet side sought to keep strictly within the already established facts. At first it was suggested that the Polish government-in-exile be charged with an attempt to seize power in Warsaw; today we know that there were grounds for such a charge. However, it was deleted (by Stalin) and there remained only the undeniable view that the Soviet government had not been notified of the urpising. The document indicated that no army command in the world, American or Soviet, could tolerate

"an uprising being organized in a large city ahead of the front lines of its troops without its knowledge and contrary to its operational plans. There is no question that if, before the uprising in Warsaw began, the Soviet command had been asked about the expediency of staging an uprising in Warsaw in early August, it would have argued against. Soviet troops having covered more than 500 kilometres, fighting all the way, were too tired and not ready to take Warsaw by storm, bearing in mind moreover that by this time the Germans had already switched their armoured reserves from the West to the Warsaw area."

Indeed, one has only to read Konstantin Rokossovsky's memoirs and his bitter comments as to how different a course events would have taken had the uprising begun when Soviet and Polish troops reached Warsaw! The order of the day issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish People's Army on September 15, 1944, has a similar purport. It states:

"Had the uprising started now, had it been coordinated with the Soviet command and that of the Polish People's Army, the bridges could have been kept intact, which would have served to speedily liberate the whole of Warsaw..."

But that did not happen. Nor was General Bor alone to blame. The Soviet government asked London directly why the British government had not deemed it necessary to notify the Soviet command of plans for the uprising. The conclusion was drawn:

"There is no doubt that had the British government taken steps to have the Soviet command duly notified of the impending uprising in Warsaw, events in Warsaw would have taken quite a different course."

Having set out these considerations, the Soviet Union introduced in its September 9 note the proposal mentioned at the beginning to institute an unbiassed committee to clarify the question of who started the uprising. We believe that today the reader has sufficient evidence at his disposal to understand why Churchill declined the Soviet proposal.

In a message to Stalin, Churchill wrote: "Whatever the rights or wrongs of the beginnings of the Warsaw rising," it was insignificant. He could afford to say so, for it was not he, but the people of Warsaw, who had to pay the price.

(to be continued)

The Kazan phenomenon

Ksenia Myalo

Why do boys gang together to beat each other up? What motivates them? Who directs it? A sociologist voices her views.

The Kazan phenomenon arose within the context of widespread economic, social and political corruption, concurrently with the emergence of a stratum of underground millionaires, as the object of a racket and consequently of racketeering gangs of the "Any-Old-How" type. Each of these corrupt institutions and individuals not only generated a quite specific aura of immoral and asocial behaviour, but also needed mobile cadres of "soldiers" capable not only of discharging the functions of bodyguards whenever necessary, but also of operating to expand the social territory controlled.

Concluded. For the beginning see No.33.

Equally important is another process still largely overlooked so far, without which it would have been impossible to find adequate resources for recruiting "soldiers" or even less so for ensuring the extensive reproduction of gangs. We mean the degradation of the socio-cultural environment for vast numbers of the country's population. Most characteristically expressed in the life style of the new urban areas, it has had the greatest effect on the younger generation.

The problem of socio-cultural ambience

Not infrequently even perhaps more often than not, we tend to reduce the problem in effect to the inferior organization of leisure facilities when discussing the new urban environment and concomitant youth problems associated with it. Such was the view that prevailed in Kazan too, when the first gangs emerged.

Meanwhile, the problem of the socio-cultural ambience in which the present-day urban – and not just urban – teenager lives, is far more complex and can by no means be reduced merely to the problem of leisure facilities. Sociologists are accustomed to terming the process, which we first encountered in the mid-1970s, as the process of marginalization. It is usually observed wherever there is a mass influx of the rural population into urban areas, wherever one ethnic group infiltrates the territory of another, wherever large numbers of people removed from their usual ecological and social environment are unable to adjust to another. This is a dramatic, even tragic, situation, auguring dire consequences not only for the "marginals" themselves, but for society as a whole, especially when the destruction of the natural cultural habitat affects whole regions with the speed of an epidemic. Yet even today sociological forecasting has not been incorporated into our town-building and demographic policies; as for the 1960s and 1970s, the psychological and cultural aspects of the new urban spatial organization were ignored completely and the results were not long in coming.

The first gangs were made up of teenagers from new urban neighbourhoods and those suburban communities incor-

porated within city limits, to this day the zones where the gangs are most in evidence. This "territorial" marginality is greatly reinforced by social marginality, more specifically by the proliferation of vocational training schools and secondary technical educational colleges, as affording the most promising ground for recruiting and controlling gang members (more than 60 per cent). However, we should not regard the large proportion of teenagers from broken and single-parent families as a primary fact or, inasmuch as in itself this unfortunate state is largely due to, and evidence of a deeper all-embracing process of social degradation.

Acquiring, but not working for it

Inherent in this degradation which is enormously significant, is the crisis of meaningful social values and ideals, the wholesale rise of a consumerism characterized by social inequality in distribution and consumption. In the case of teenagers from low-income and culturally disadvantaged strata excluded from special channels of the distribution of goods and services, such a state of affairs naturally engenders a desire to get one's own back on society. In turn, consuming more goods and services is seen as the only conceivable way of doing so, just as the assertion of authority is seen as the sole possible means of acquiring it.

The gang at the lowest level symbolizes that same all-embracing process of corruption of our society in the basic meaning of the term, as do the criminal fraternities at the top. The essence of this fundamental corruption derives from the replacement of the need **to create** with the need **to acquire,** which inevitably results in a corresponding distortion of social relationships in a group organized to achieve such ends.

As for teenagers infected with the virus of consumerism, this inner desire manifests itself in a coarse and primitive manner through a hypertrophied craving to possess material goods without a corresponding desire to create them.

A short while ago Lieut.Col. V. Zyrianov of the Ministry of Internal Affairs commented in Komsomolskaya Pravda on the psychology of adolescent criminals. He underscored the simplistic and naive character of the widespread idea that adolescent crime stems directly from low-income broken homes, and noted that hypertrophied consumerization is the basic motivation not only for misdemeanour, but for social activity generally.

"Thus, for instance, it has been found that most teenagers would like good jobs. However, when we asked them what they meant by that, it appeared that they meant easy, well-paid jobs, nothing more."

That is the case in Alma-Ata. However, a similar trend is to be observed in Kazan, and no doubt elsewhere.

Many Kazan teenagers claim that it is impossible to subsist on a monthly 180-200 ruble wage, which is why their best option is to take a barman's job or work in the sales network, but not break their backs in a factory.

There is no point at all in discussing whether such wages are adequate for a working man. Quite obviously they are not, though many made do with such wages in the past, and still do. However, teenagers want to consume what they do not desire to create, indeed since they opt not for a qualification or trade that would ensure higher earnings, or campaigning against everything perceived as unjust. They opt mainly for jobs where the money would roll in or a life of crime.

In other words, those rules of the game the mafia offers are accepted, by virtue of which the area of all-embracing corruption spreads, ousting socially constructive motivation in favour of selfish money-grubbing.

Understandably, wherever consumerist motivation is so much in evidence, the priorities and social norms so conscientiously implanted in teenagers by the stratum of leaders easily entrench themselves, the more so as the gang's whole structural organization, with its forcefully expressed domination-subordination relationships, exercises an enormous psychological influence on youngsters at the lowest social level.

Rudimentary social organization

In effect, we can say that we are dealing here with elements of rudimentary social organization of the pack or herd type, which appear, as a rule, wherever the social and human links of a higher and more complex type have degenerated or been destroyed, which is more specifically manifest in a gang's initial preference for a specific territory to control and a primitive authoritarian hierarchy.

Horizontally, the gang forms around an initial nucleus, mostly the so–called box, and less often the courtyard, i.e., two to four blocks of housing that not infrequently share a single street number. Several boxes form a unit and in turn several units create a grouping or "office," with one generic name and controlled territory, access to which is barred in principle to all outsiders. According to the Tartar republic's statistics, Kazan has 63 groupings with 196 leaders, even though rumour persistenly has it that there are far more.

Vertically, the groupings, as has been noted, are of a strictly hierarchical character and, with few variations, are composed of 12- to 14-year-olds, as the "supers," 14- to 16-year-olds, as the "middlers," 16- to 18-year-olds, as the "young ones," and 18- to 20-year-olds, as the "elders." Each age group has its own leader or "author," who is thus in the separate highest category of "authority."

Sometimes, nowadays more and more often, the gang may take on at its lowest level ten-year-olds, if not eight-year-olds, the "scrapings," "shells" or "peas," and, at the top, the "old ones," implying people of 25 and more. As soon as the caste of "old ones" increases, the gang in effect loses the characteristics of a purely teen-age gang and tends to become a formation of which one becomes a lifelong member.

It is also evident how much this structure has in common with the system that is gaining ground in the army known as "grandpa-ism"; indeed, they are already strengthening and nourishing one another.

"Neither organization, nor chaos," one young man told me. "Just primitive centralization." Most apt, I think.

The gang's age rise is accompanied by the enlargement of the social territory controlled and of the "tribute" accordingly exacted. In several urban neighbourhoods the gangs already fully control the vocational training schools within their territory; no outsider can enter these schools unless he contributes a sizable bribe.

There is also a more serious factor, especially when considered in the long term. As the age level of the gang rises and the social territory under its control expands, the gang enjoys greater opportunities to influence the distribution of the workforce.

The choice of a vocational training school or secondary technical educational college as leading towards further education, work, and a place in life, is closely linked with the group's requirements and the system of priorities it has evolved.

"In the main they take jobs in wine shops or bottle-return depots, pubs."

"Among us there are chaps who started off as porters, and then became salesmen;

if you sell vodka you can save enough money in the space of six months to buy a car."

"A guy may just have joined a gang, he's only 13, but he already has enough money to buy a motorbike; later when he lands in borstal he gets money again. It's been like that for ten years or so now. A friend of mine got several thousand rubles when he landed in borstal so he wouldn't give away the ringleaders' names. After his release, he at once bought himself a car and then began to work in a shop; now he has bought himself a house in the country and a Japanese music centre."

The basic vector for the allotment of manpower is the transfer of the energy of the younger generation from the productive to the non-productive sphere. Jobs in the sales network are highly prized, even though outwardly they may be of the lowest social standing, as it were. For instance, a job at a bottle-return depot. Quite a high proportion of the leaders are also people who have no fixed occupation. For instance, they do temporary jobs as porters or night watchmen.

One in four of Kazan's 35 leaders in the age-group of 20-25 and older, have never done any socially gainful work, while about 25 per cent – or 40 per cent according to other data – have prison convictions.

Who swings the majority?

By instilling teen-age mentalities with crude greed, an absolute indifference to everything outside the interests of the gang, and cruelty towards outsiders and even each other, the ring-leaders contribute to the deep-seated degeneration of the social fabric over a wide area, and to wide-scale moral degradation.

This is especially manifested in the vulgar sexual behaviour of members of such gangs, sometimes inclined to violence. Another characteristic feature of their way of life is the "common possession" of girls in whom cruelty and rude feelings are inculcated and who often become inferior mothers in the future.

Of Kazan's 64, or perhaps 73 gangs, only 17, the law enforcement agencies say, can be regarded as frankly aggressive or particularly brutal. The remainder emerged either due to the need for self-defence or by way of imitation. However, it is precisely the statistical minority that is having such a devastating effect on Kazan life, not only because it exerts terrorist pressure, but also because it compels imitation, albeit for the purpose of self-defence, and imposes a group psychology and rudimentary life structure upon the mass of young people. This is all the easier to do in a situation where traditional social values and associated forms of youth organization are in crisis, when the acute, almost vital need for social integrity, which is so natural for the teenager, is met by a surrogate intgegrity and manifests itself in a peer or territorial grouping.

"When people club together, they have their own environment and can communicate in a sincere and lively way. At school with the teacher and the other pupils, they won't do that. Take this chap. I can be quite sure of him and be open with him. But take a YCLer. Am I going to talk with him? About what?"

"When we criticize the previous system, we are criticizing the entire older generation. It is only natural that whatever the older generation may say will have no effect on the young. Everything before, apart from Lenin, has already been denigrated to a greater or lesser extent. Young people have been left without any ideology at all."

Naturally, "ideology" is understood here mainly as meaning a range of ideas concerning the values and aspirations of a specific social whole, of society. The teenager is well aware of the extent to which all of society is rent today by the rivalry of group interests – departmental, clan, or territorial.

As I see it, we still seem to be unaware of the corrupting influence that "closed" cities and zones, whose inhabitants enjoy privileged status by very fact of their residence there, still has on our society. Is not an almost instinctive hatred responsible for the clash between Muscovites and non-Muscovites? Is this not why a Moscow schoolboy will sneer at an "out-of-towner" in much the same way as a skinhead will snub a Turk in West Germany?

Group versus group, territory versus territory, "ours" versus "yours" – such is the situation that this engenders in society. Indeed, what else can we expect, when despite all the assurances trotted out by the Ministry of Higher Education, out-of-towners are time and again denied admission to Moscow and Leningrad colleges or obliged to pass a separate set of exams? And how are we to take the suggestion recently voiced in the press that we allow Moscow and Leningrad school-leavers not to take the main entrance exams? Does that not mean that such exams should be solely for "provincials"?

However, today, complementing the clashes between group interests inherited from the past, are new conflicts such as the far more acute generational relationships and group warfare in the press; hence to some extent the street gangs in Kazan and other cities are a foretaste of a danger that could develop into a most formidable menace in the foreseeable future, the loss of that social harmony, that we are accustomed to call socio-political consensus, which prevents us sliding into the chaos of strife.

Barrels of gunpowder

When I arrived in Kazan, it did not match up to the expectations derived from what I had heard and read about its street gangs. I thought it would present a dark, gloomy uncared-for picture. However, reality, as is often the case, is more complex, and the city, with its well preserved central historical quarter, does not look it.

A special role in Kazan life is played by its University, which has preserved not only its external traditional appearance, but also features of its erstwhile conspicuously stormy student socio-political activity. Of late, it has been the venue of many rallies and meetings. Its environmentalists are doing some fascinating work, and a political debating club operates under the aegis of the physics department. However, this current in Kazan life would appear to be completely out of touch with the lower stream, where gangs "shape policy by streets" as, with their at times characteristic expressiveness, they describe the whole complex of intergroup relationships. Yet the influence of "gopniks" has already reached the University as well. One suddenly comes across a carving of a crown on a lecture-room bench, the emblem the Kazan "kings" use to mark their possessions. Next to it one may glimpse the vigorous protest: "The gopnik is the worst!" Is this also a scene of warfare? According to official statistics, 82 students are already members of gangs. However when gangs are mentioned, statistics must obviously be taken with a grain of salt inasmuch as a gang's actual impact may always transcend its own limits. In every area where a gang emerges and entrenches itself it is always a source of social decay.

As so far there are no reverse impulses, the number of gang members is steadily increasing, for which reason it is already being said that the Kazan gangsters have "exported" their structure to other Volga cities (specifically Cheboksary and Yoshkar-Ola), which in turn implies festive soil there.

Severe parades, morning training fights, dubbed "the good-morning programme" and out-of-town jamborees... "Barrels of gunpowder, which for the time being links up only with itself," my interlocutor says, and I cannot but agree.

JUNIOR WORLD



Let educationists tackle the Kazan problem

I don't know in what vein to write – in pain? In anger? In despair? Or perhaps in a businesslike manner?

This issue of New Times concludes the publication of the sociological study by Ksenia Myalo on the teenagers' war in Kazan. Teenagers have always ganged up, quarrelled and fought with each other. But in Kazan they have overstepped the bounds of humanity and started to kill. "West Side Story" ended with a murder that terrified everyone, but this Eastside story seems to be beginning with murders. For that reason reports from Kazan sound like news from Chernobyl or Sumgait.

There is a catch phrase "the orphan of Kazan," that is, a person who extorts help from people. But the feuding Kazan teenagers did indeed have spiritually starved and in this sense orphan childhoods. They were fed with moral pap that looked monotonously green, tasted flat, smelled false, and nurtured spiritual starvelings. Here the phrase "What is the militia doing?" will not answer, for we need a whole complex of social and pedagogical measures.

There is another breeding ground of violence, however, which is less well known. It is described in detail in the report by Nina Pizhurina, Leningrad correspondent of Uchitelskaya Gazeta. In the vocational education system there are non-prestigious vocational schools that train builders, and which town boys and girls are not prepared to enter. To fulfil their student quota, these schools recruit school leavers after eighth grade countrywide. Every year 20,000 boys and girls are brought to Leningrad alone, given accommodation in hostels and left without adult supervision.

And here, predictably, the phenomenon of "old men," "dedovshchina" – the power of senior boys, the power that rests on organized violence – is bound to take over. This phenomenon, born in prison cells and camps, spread to the army (which is now being much discussed), then infiltrated technical and vocational schools. In any place where teenagers live away from home and hundreds and thousands of them are accommodated in hostels, they are threatened with abuse and beatings bred by "dedovshchina." Prison ethics, prison education methods are spreading like a black stain over our country's young. And everyone keeps mum! While scholarly conferences of a sort take place at which academicians learnedly hold forth on types of school, a student at the vocational school, writes to his mother: "As soon as you receive my letter, book a trunk call urgently, or else I'll take care of this Leningrad myself. I'll end up either in the militia or in hospital. I am already in need of hospital treatment. My kidneys, back and head are aching as a result of being beaten up."

To hospital or the militia! Girls have a third option. Nina Pizhurina quotes a school instructor: "Our vocational school should be training builders for one of the most beautiful cities in the world. I dare say with all responsibility that at present it is instead producing thieves, drug addicts, promiscuous girls, underage single mothers." And what about builders? Monstrous fact: half their graduates leave construction sites in the first year of work. It turns out that the children's sufferings make no sense at all, they are caused by somebody's desire to show off.

Today, the newspaper reports, attempts are being made to change the situation somewhat, and yet, when the new school year begins, thousands of recruited teenagers will once again be brought to big cities. In the morning they will have a festive occasion, the Day of Knowledge, and hear speeches and congratulations, and at night in the dormitory they will be dispossessed of their money and their things, humiliated and made to fag for "old men" in senior grades, and disobedient ones will be beaten up, and beaten up constantly until they capitulate.

And the thing that cries out is that had all these outrages been pointed to from the highest government level, immediately everything would have started moving, immediately bigwigs of all ranks would have taken special flights to Kazan and Leningrad, ways and means and solutions would have been found before you could say Jack Robinson. But our system of public education, as evidenced by the facts in question for that matter, is run by people who can hear a telephone ring from high-up but turn a deaf ear downward, to the cries of victimized children. Every day I open the newspapers in the hope of reading an article sounding the alarm – nothing of the kind! Probably everyone is on vacation, recovering their health which has been shaken by hard times connected with cutting down on staff. All now say unanimously that the bureaucrats who secured new posts after redundancy shake-ups have nothing at all to fear.

Then what is to be done?

Schools in which the virus of the "old men" phenomenon cannot be rooted out should be disbanded, similar to the closedown or even the burning down in some countries of maternity homes if they are infected with staphylococcus.

As far as the Kazan problem is concerned, why should only militia, journalists and sociologists deal with the teenagers? And where are the educationists? When the tragedy happened in Chernobyl, the leading physicists were sent there. In this case, the leading educational theoreticians should be sent to Kazan. Why not corresponding member of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences Victor Korotov (Director of the Institute of General Education Problems) or the famous theoretician, corresponding member Boris Likhachev, for that matter – let them show in the field how their theories work.

Simon Soloveichik



The idea of making music together is coming to seem increasingly attractive to both Soviet and American musicians. It has been backed by the well-known Soviet composer **Edison Denisov,** who wrote his latest score for the recently organized Soviet-American youth symphony orchestra. E. Denisov's orchestral piece was played for the first time on August 19 in Moscow's Tchaikovsky Hall as part of a programme including works by Aaron Copland, Ives, Prokofyev and Mahler.

Edison Denisov was born in Tomsk in 1929. As a child, he taught himself to play several musical instruments. But it was only in 1951 that he enrolled at the Moscow Conservatoire in the class of the eminent Soviet composer Professor Vissarion Shebalin, after having already graduated from the Faculty of Mathematics at Tomsk University.

A sincere and rigorous musician, Denisov has written music of different genres – vocal, instrumental, symphonic and opera. His ballet "Confession" (1984) was successfully staged by the "Estonia" Theatre. The composer has orchestrated some pieces by Moussorgsky and contributed theoretical works about the music of Bartok, Shostakovich, Prokofyev and Stravinski.

Denisov once said in an interview: "All the best works in the arts, no matter what style they are written in, are still traditional. I have tried to synthesize the different techniques used by composers. In my music I seek to synthesize different types of musical technique in order to achieve the desired freedom of musical expression."

The Prime Minister of Japan, **Noboru Takeshita,** is feeling the full weight of the financial scandal that has erupted in his country and led to the opposition parties boycotting parliament until those responsible are punished.

Apart from the Prime Minister, three other leading politicians are involved: the Secretary-General of the Liberal-Democratic party, Shintaro Abe, the Minister of Finance Kiichi Miyazawa, and former

Premier Yasuhiro Nakasone. Takeshita's aides and a number of other politicians had bought up shares in the brokerage company Recruit Cosmos cheaply before they were officially offered on the stock market. When the sale of Recruit Cosmos shares began, the price soared quickly and the farsighted aides earned several billion yen.

The press and the opposition maintain that Takeshita's aides and party colleagues undertook the operation in order to obtain money for the LDP leaders. It is not the first case of its kind. Trading in shares is often used as a cover for bribery. In June, four staff members of N. Takeshita's office were forced to resign because of accusations of accepting bribes when placing government advertising contracts.

The government's new press secretary

Lev Voznesensky, Soviet Television's home policy observer, has been put in charge of the Information Department, a new subdivision of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers.

The establishment of the Press Department marks another step towards glasnost, says Lev Voznesensky, and testifies to our government's most serious approach to such processes now current here as democratization and opening up.

The 62-year-old host of the popular TV programme "Perestroika: Problems and Solutions," has had an eventful life. He saw active service during the Patriotic War. In the years of Stalin's reign of terror he spent a few years in jail as the son of Alexander Voznesensky, a prominent economist, Rector of the Leningrad University, Minister of Education of the Russian Federation, who had been executed then. Upon graduating from the Moscow University's Faculty of Economics, Lev Voznesensky completed its post-graduate course, and later worked at the Kommunist

journal and on the staff of the CPSU Central Committee.

Lev Voznesensky has a reputation of a prominent scientist. He has to his credit more than 200 publications, chiefly on subjects of political economy and economic policy. His articles on domestic policy and economics have been appearing in scientific journals and mass-circulation periodicals. Lev Voznesensky is among the contributors of New Times as well.

The story behind his programme, originally called Problems – Explorations – Decisions, is noteworthy. It took six years of hard effort for it to appear on our screens, which happened at the end of December 1980. The programme constituted a live discussion o the cardinal problems of ou society's development. The guests – the leading members of the Party apparatus and state machinery, executive economic bodies, well-known Soviet scholars – answer viewers' calls coming in over 2(telephones installed in the studio.

The audience's interest in the programme can be judged by the following statistics: six of them went on the air on the eve of the 27th Party Congress, drawing 5,500 telephone calls and over 21,00(letters.

Today Lev Voznesensky is among the most popula Soviet journalists. He is interviewed by foreign correspondents, invited to address TV and radio audiences and to lecture in many countries.

Lev Voznesensky is of the opinion that the Information Department of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers is to play a notable role in the broadening and deepening of glasnost in Soviet society.

Noboru Takeshita, born 1924, became Prime Minister in November 1987. During the war he attended a school for Kamikaze pilots. A member of parliament for 30 years, he has held a number of government posts and been Secretary-General of the LDP. As Minister of Construction he strengthened the already existing ties with building concerns through his son-in-law (his family owns the fourth most important construction company). During the election campaign, these firms ensured him financial support.

On July 19, 1979, the future Professor and Deputy Rector of the University of León in Nicaragua, **Ernesto Medina Sandino** and five of his comrades appealed to the West German authorities to turn the Nicaraguan Consulate in Bonn over to them as representatives of revolutionary people. They had just learned that the



dictator Anastasio Somoza had fled from Nicaragua. Medina had been forced to leave his country and settle in the F.R.G., where he collected funds to help the Sandinist National Liberation Front guerrillas.

"The West German authorities were quick to assess the political situation resulting from the entry of Sandinista units into Managua," he recalls. "Together with representatives from the authorities, we arrived at the Embassy to seal off its archives."

In 1980 Medina returned to Nicaragua and started working at the University in León. "The first years after the revolution," he said, "were characterized by idealism and euphoria. Very soon, however, the Nicaraguans came up against the harsh realities – the need to ensure a more rational use of national resources in expectation of the time when all efforts could be concentrated on rebuilding the country."

Medina believes that no one in Nicaragua expected that after the revolution the country would come up against such hatred on the part of the U.S.

His University has 4,000 students training to be doctors and pharmacists.

Zoltán Zemlényi is only 17 years old, but that has not stopped his book becoming an immediate bestseller in Hungary. His diary bearing the strange title "Hopparezimi" passed from hand to hand. In just one day the 17-year-old author became famous



throughout the country. The Patronage Society awarded him its prize set up in 1987 for outstanding human and ethical achievement.

Zoltán was born in 1970 and till March 1985, he lived like any other boy, surrounded by family love, enjoying sport, and playing in a rock group. He drew very well, and at one party in his school was selected as the most handsome boy.

On March 7, 1985, Zoltán was involved in a traffic accident – he was knocked down by a car. For a whole month he was in a coma, and when he did open his eyes he was unable to move or speak.

The accident had deprived him of virtually everything. What he missed most was contacts with other people. Zoltán was forced to seek other ways of self-expression. That was how the board for conversations appeared (a sheet of paper with letters of the alphabet on it). Then he started a diary, written on a typewriter with just his left index finger – the story of his inhuman daily struggle against fate, his hopes and his love... That is the story of his book.

Day in day out, he clenched his teeth and did special exercises. They helped – Zoltán gradually learned to stand, left his wheelchair, began to use his hands – first the left, then the right. He tried drawing again, and each day showed an improvement. Finally he started learning to talk again – so far it is only his patient family who can understand him, but Zoltán refuses to give up.

"In our times so many people want to stand out. I admit that I too all my life wanted to be different from others – and I have succeeded," he writes, not without irony, in his book.

Agnes Horvath,
BUDAPEST

Top favourite

The name of the American high diver **Gregory Louganis** was first written into the annals of the Olympic Games in Montreal in 1976, when he won a silver medal. Eight years later he became a double Olympic champion in Los Angeles, winning golds in the springboard and high diving events (true, in the absence of strong competitors from Europe). Despite a serious three-month-old injury, at the end of July Greg was able to win the U.S. championship for the 47th (!) time. To that list of honours one could add five times world champion, and winner of the World Cup an endless number of times. So there can be no doubt that the holder of the greatest number of diving titles is regarded as the top favourite at the coming Olympic Games.



When asked whether he will be able to repeat his Los Angeles triumph in Seoul, Luganis replies that winning the gold is not the most important thing to him – what matters is feeling again how pliant, light and responsive his body is, and giving audiences the wonderful sense of flight...

Greg was born in San Diego, California, in 1960. As an 8-month-old baby he was adopted by the Louganises – Americans of Greek origin. When he was three they placed him in a swimming and high diving group at the local swimming pool. Dr Samuel Lee (1948 and 1952 Olympic champion) noticed the boy for his inborn rhythm and suppleness, and drew up a special programme for him.

Greg studied at the drama department of California University, and dreamed of acting in films and on TV. But his desire to devote himself to the arts (by that time he had already won a gold medal at the 1984 Olympic Games) was blocked by the TV studios of the state, who were advertising him exclusively as a sports star. In a fit of depression, Greg started taking drugs and drinking, but he found the strength to return to big-time sport. In recent years he has been conducting a rather successful anti-drug and anti-alcohol campaign.

A. Kun

The conflict between a private detective and the Counterintelligence Service in the investigation of the assassination of Prime Minister Olof Palme is threatening to turn into a political scandal



The Carlsson affair

Denmark's Helsingor and Sweden's Halsingborg are separated by a stretch of water a mere 5 kms across. Ferries there operate like buses in a big city. Passport and customs control for Scandinavians is a pure formality. On the night of June 2 those crossing from the Danish side were mostly Swedish tourists and drivers dreaming of empty roads. From among them customs officials chose to stop Per-Ola Karlsson. And they were not mistaken: in the boot of his car they found expensive specialized acoustic listening equipment. Such forms of surveillance and importing the equipment to carry it out had been banned by the Swedish parliament...

All the Swedish custom officers' successes in apprehending cargoes of drugs and other dangerous contraband are based on tip-offs. Otherwise all they can do is find an extra bottle of spirits or carton of cigarettes. This time, however, they were in complete control of the situation. They were not impressed by the police card shown by the detained man, nor even by the special letter of recommendation from the chief of Counterintelligence Sune Sandström saying that the bearer was carrying out a special mission for the Security Police (SAPO). Wakened by a telephone call from the customs, the SAPO chief said he knew nothing of any listening equipment, and the next day the story found its way into the papers. A day earlier the mass media had reported another sensation: a certain Ebbe Carlsson (the surname is as common as Smith is in England) had for six months been conducting a private investigation at the expense of a financier friend into the assassination in 1986 of Prime Minister Olof Palme. The coincidence in timing was not accidental, and now members of the Riksdag Constitution Committee, a special committee of the prosecutor's office, the parliamentary SAPO committee and may others are trying to unravel the mystery. What happened?

A glass of water

A select audience gathered in the wood-pannelled house of parliament: politicians, police officers, journalists and ordinary citizens who had passed through a special control. They sat in a gallery decorated in the Ilya Glazunov style with frescoes from Swedish history.

The first to be called was Ebbe himself, a former journalist, now a publisher, a Social-Democrat, familiar with the corridors of power, and an ardent advocate of unconventional methods of investigating murky cases.

"Immediately after the assassination of Olof Palme I was in the police headquarters with my friend Commissar Hans Holmer, who was in charge of the investigations," said the amateur detective in reply to questions from the committee. "Ever since, the wish to get to the bottom of the affair has haunted me. Gradually, from my contacts with Holmer and other investigating officers I came to the conclusion that the group of SAPO men following the Kurd trail were closest to the truth. The day before Palme's death, the then head of the security police told me that his people were tapping the telephone conversations of a number of Kurds living in Sweden (the tapping of electronic signals, unlike acoustic tapping, is not forbidden by Swedish law – A.P.). The Kurds were discussing preparations for the "marriage" – their code for murder – of a top official. SAPO paid no attention to this talk and left the Prime Minister unprotected on the day of his assassination."

Later Ebbe Carlsson said he learned that at the same time the Counterintelligence Service had been trailing a "Kurd" during his walks in the Old City near the residence of Olof Palme in Västerlanggatan. But for some reason the two items of information were never linked or analyzed in concert.

Two investigating agents, Valter Kegö and Jan-Henrik Barriling, noticed this ommission, according to Ebbe Carlsson, and decided to put it right. It brought them to source "A," a man from the Kurdish emigrants, who had broken with his fellow countrymen. All their attempts to get the SAPO chiefs interested in him and win support failed. Per-Göran Näss, then head of counterintelligence, expressed the view that it would be impossible to recruit "A." The agents then got in touch with Holmer, who had already been removed from the investigation, and through him with Ebbe Carlsson. Carlsson, immediately fired by their con-

viction as it reinforced his own ideas on the subject, began working on his friends – the chief of the Swedish Police, the head of SAPO's operations bureau, the chairman of the SAPO paliamentary committee, and the Minister of Justice.

At regular evening meals at Ebbe's house and during tete-à-tete conversations, a theory was elaborated about the possibility of working on "A" and getting the truth from him, exposing Palme's assassins, and at the same time finding out why Näss was acting so strangely. Because of SAPO's failures and other unseemly stories associated with it, the organization had long been the target of attacks in Sweden, so none of the above-mentioned officials dared defend it in such dubious circumstances. In one form or other, Ebbe Carlsson told members of the parliamentary committee, they gave him their blessing in going ahead with his investigations. He was not formally given the job, but there was complete understanding, he claimed. He then asked for a glass of water to relieve his parched throat after two-and-a-half hours of answering questions.

Anders Björck, a Conservative, handed him a whole bottle of mineral water. He would have been glad to offer him all the Ramlösa water available, for Ebbe Carlsson's story and every word he uttered was an answer to the prayer of the opposition bourgeois parties that dreamed of toppling the Social Democratic government at the approaching general election.

The Moor must go

It was revealed that the private sleuth had succeeded in getting a letter of recommendation last May from Minister of Justice Anna-Greta Leijon to the appropriate British authorities to establish direct contacts with the British special services. Ridiculed by the British, Ebbe Carlsson, did not, however, manage to make use of the letter. But after the scandal in the press, the Minister of Justice was forced to resign to avoid a vote of no-confidence in parliament. Smelling blood, the bourgeois parties have decided that the sacrifice of one figure is not enough and are continuing to make the most of the Carlsson affair, hoping it will deal a blow not just to Ebbe, but to another Carlsson – Ingvar, the present leader of the Social Democratic government.

A gala performance requires top actors: more and more witnesses were called before the committee. The chief of the Swedish police Nils-Erik Ahmanson testified that he had asked Ebbe to follow the Kurd trail, visit Paris for a confidential talk with Iran's former President Banisadr, and rent a secret flat for meetings with "A." "We also discussed compensating him for his expenses, and strengthening the Kegö-Barriling group. I signed a special letter of recommendation for Ebbe for his overseas operations. But I was against his conducting parallel investigations and using tapping devices," the police chief tried to persuade the committee.

SAPO chief Sune Sandström told the committee he had had occasion to meet



Ebbe Carlsson, the "hero" of the affair (left), Per-Göran Näss, former counterintelligence chief (right) and Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson.

Ebbe privately, discuss cooperation with him, and visit the secret flat. "I recommended Per-Ola Karlsson as a guard to Ebbe. But I knew nothing about his intention to acquire listening equipment," he stressed.

The statements of the police chiefs resembled well rehearsed parts. Yes, they helped the man, used him, but he let them down. In short, the devil was to blame. As for the former SAPO chief, accused of hindering the investigation of the Kurd trail, he did not bother with equivocal remarks. "If foreign intelligence services had wanted to harm SAPO, they could not have done more damage than Ebbe Carlsson," he stated. He expressed the view that work on source "A" was of no interest, since the theory that Palme had been murdered by an Iranian mullah using Kurds to do the killing and with the participation of the Syrians was quite unsupported by the facts.

Only yesterday Ebbe was at the top of the world, much was forgiven him, as the end justified the means. But the end has not been achieved and therefore unlawful activities have no justification. And in Sweden, where respect for the law and moral principles is very strong, the majority of the population find it unacceptable that a private individual, even with support in political circles and the help of the police, should be allowed access to documents concerning SAPO's secret investigations and try to use prohibited spy equipment. That is why the Prosecutor accused Ebbe and his accomplices.

The shadow of the assassinated Premier hovers over the country's political horizon. The right seek to use the scandal not for attacks on the police, but to protect it from the "arbitrary" actions of the Social Democrats. Without any proof, they are pressing the idea that Ebbe started the whole affair in order to compromise SAPO both in Sweden and abroad, and acted almost with the knowledge of the Ingvar Carlsson government.

Attempts are being made to give a political colouring to a criminal affair. Till now the idea of a Carlsson conspiracy has not affected the sentiments of the widest sections of the public, but it has affected the background to the general election. The divided bourgeois opposition, with no serious alternative to offer to the policy of the Social Democratic government is seeking to turn the committee into a Supreme Court to pass a sentence which, though with no force in law, could be used to create a scandal. In the holiday season, the newspapers virtually live for news from the Rikstag.

Interviewed recently, the Swedish Premier expressed confidence that the Carlsson affair would not shake the Social Democrats' positions in the election. "The electorate," he said, "are interested in a traditional election campaign dominated by really urgent issues."

The question that electros will have to answer at the September 18 General Election is much more serious: which is more important, the mistake made by Anna-Greta Leijon or the socio-economic results of the Social Democrats while in office?

ALEXANDER POLYUKHOV

our own correspondent

STOCKHOLM

Photo and drawing from Dagens Nyheter (Sweden)

Businessmen from Zatsepa Street

A rapid reading course, a fitness programme tailored to each student's physical condition, an accelerated foreign language learning plan... This is just a taste of what the Management Training Centre, just opened in Moscow, has to offer.

The heavy-handed administrative methods of running industry, practised for years, left no room for managers in the true sense of the word, i.e., creative people capable of generating new ideas. Even today one still hears talk of business games and brain waves being just so much "bourgeois trickery."

Speaking at the centre's opening ceremony, Academician Ivan Obraztsov, Minister of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education of the R.S.F.S.R., quoted some interesting statistics. At a preliminary estimate the composition of the work force in the leading capitalist countries, the U.S. in particular, at the beginning of the 21st century will be as follows: 1.5 per cent of the population will be employed in the agro-industrial complex; 2 per cent in industry; about 30 per cent in the services; and over 60 per cent in documentation science concerned with problems of automation, planning and management...

What about us?

The Soviet economy has not yet overcome the inertia of stagnation. On the other hand, we have a wealth of resources and abundant manpower. So why are we in such a mess? The answer is simple enough: we do not know how to manage our economy properly... We are far behind the West in cybernetics, genetics, advertising (which, until recently, we haven't taken seriously), scientific management; this lamentable list could be extended... It has taken us too long to realize that by rejecting advanced techniques and practices on the grounds that they are "alien" and "won't do here," we kept widening the gap. When Soviet power was in its infancy, Lenin dreamed of a time when every housewife would be able to manage the state – not in a slapdash manner, that is, but with professional expertise. We do not have to "invent the bicycle," so to say; it is enough to use one of the better models that has long been in smooth and efficient operation in many countries. The well-known American motor company General Motors, for instance, is known to owe its success chiefly (over 60 per cent) to its managers' superior competence. Here is another example, much more recent and more relevant to us. Last year a few production teams from Leningrad's Krasny Vyborzhets factory went through a management course, by way of an experiment, at the Plekhanov National Economics Institute in Moscow. Within two or three months of graduation, they brought the factory an extra profit of about half a million rubles.

The Management Training Centre is the first of seven of its kind to be opened: we have to make up for our neglect of managerial training over past decades which has resulted in a terrible shortage of management experts. The centre is to train and retrain managers for industrial plants, organizations, departments and cooperatives, and equip them with special knowledge and skills.

On October 1, an old mansion in Moscow's Zatsepa Street, which once housed a business school, will open its doors to trainees who will be offered instruction in such subjects as applied economics, production management, cost-accounting techniques, the theory and practice of foreign trade, and marketing. Classes will be conducted by experts from the Plekhanov Institute and guest lecturers, including some from abroad.

"We want to draw upon the latest in management methods developed worldwide," Vyacheslav Gorlopanov, the director of the centre, says. "We are already establishing business contacts with our opposite numbers in Hungary, the G.D.R., Bulgaria, Poland, Finland, the F.R.G. and Italy, and negotiating with those in the U.S., Austria and Japan. We would like our trainees to gain practical business experience in one of these countries."

The "business school" will operate on a self-supporting basis. All it expects the client organizations to do is to send in the persons they want trained, specify the line of activity they are to be trained in, and pay tuition fees. The durations of courses vary from three weeks to six months. It is only the completion of a full two-year course, however, that qualifies a trainee for managerial work. Tuition by correspondence is available. Learning to operate a computer is to take from 30 to 50 per cent of the total training time – the ability to handle a computer professionally is a must for the modern manager. At the client organization's request, the centre will advise it on where to employ a graduate of the course to the best advantage.

This September, the centre is to open a Businessmen's Club to which scientists, economists, big Soviet factory directors and foreign businessmen will be invited for exchanges of experience and discussions. Senior high-school students will be encouraged to embark on a young manager's course to test their abilities. If they make good, they will be recommended for admission to the National Economics Institute.

The centre is to open branches in Kurgan, Cheboksary, Vladivostok, Krasnodar, and Ulianovsk. Furthermore, it is considering chartering a large ship, fitting it out with personal computers and other training equipment, and sending it, with trainees and instructors on board, on a Mediterranean or Pacific cruise. Upon calling at each foreign port, our would-be managers could visit factories, meet professional managers, see them in action, and learn from them.

So far this is only a dream. But today many dreams are coming true.

Vladimir Galin

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